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PREFACE 
A review of symbolic interactionist literature, via study of the 
two major schools representative of the perspective (the Chicagoan and 
the Iowan), reveals a dilenuna which is responsible in no small part for 
the failure of the perspective to represent a viable theoretical orien-
tation in the discipline of social psychology. This dilenuna is a recog-
nition, that depending on the theoretical school of thought followed in 
the interactionist literature, one will encounter a greater or lesser 
commitment to a complete social psychological theoretical explanation. 
At the point of having the most complete theoretical explanation, there 
follows a less than empirically relevant conceptualization; while, at 
the point of having a less than complete theoretical explanation, the 
empirical relatedness of the constructs begin to come into focus. This 
study is an attempt to constructively react to this perceived dilemma 
in a theoretical as well as a methodologically innovative manner. 
Grateful acknowledgment is made to members of the Advisory Commit-
tee: Dr. Gene Acuff, Chairman of the Advisory Committee; Dr. Richard 
Dodder; Dr. George Arquitt; and Dr. Kenneth St. Clair. A special note 
of indebtedness is in order to Dr. Edgar Webster, Dissertation Advisor. 
This study was supported in part by a stipend in support of the 
research, made available through the Graduate Committee and the member-
ship of the Awards Committee. I would like to express my appreciation 
to these committees and to Dr. William Sibley, Director of Research, 
1974, for making this support possible. 
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Sincere appreciation is also extended to Jackie Howsden and Rusty 
Calloway for their faithful assistance in gathering the data for the 
study. And, of course, without the continued encouragement and support 
of my family from my early youth onward, this particular study would 
have been impossible; it is with the sincerest of feelings that I would 
express my appreciation for them. 
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CHAPTER I 
AN INTRODUCTION TO SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 
Some General Goals 
The ultimate goal of the following remarks may be seen, most par-
simoniously, as a clarification of and/or contribution to: 1) the pres-
ent social psychological assumption of the correspondence of attitude 
and behavior, albeit the theoretical recognition of behavior as a func-
tion of attitudes and the situation; 2) the potential theoretical and 
empirical relevance of symbolic interaction construqts to social psy-
chological issues (which presently is not fully appreciated); 3) the 
present overzealous psychologically oriented perspective of social psy-
chology. Specifically, the empirical elucidation of symbolic interac-
tionism will be shown to offer a most explicit theoretical acconunodation 
to the function: Behavior = Person x Environment. The latter variable 
is frequently theoretically (and consequently, empirically) ignored in 
present social psychological conception and research; ergo, the incon-
sistencies in social research literature and the resultant failure of 
various social program agencies which use this literature to inform their 
programs. In order to accomplish such a goal, this paper will seek to 
clarify the symbolic interactionist theory, both theoretically and 
empirically. 
Symbolic interaction, as a social psychological theoretical orien-
tation, denotes the explanation of behavior as a function of the influ-
1 
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ence that one person has on another as a result of the individual first 
mentally interacting with a set of shared other definitions, leading to 
a definition of the situation, upon which behavior follows. This social 
psychological explanation of behavior is different from a sociological 
explanation via structural functionalism (behavior phenomena are func-
tional for a larger group) as well as other social psychological explan• 
ations. Shaw and Costanzo (1970) refer to the latter (the social psy-
chological explanations) as theoretical orientations. These include the 
reinforcement (behavior is seen as a function of reinforcement patterns) ; 
the cognitive (behavior is seen as a function of the tensions/nontensions 
resulting from unbalanced/balanced cognitions); the psychoanalytic (be-
havior is seen as a function of the result of solutions to conflicting 
unconscious and conscious psychological forces); and the field theoreti-
cal (behavior is seen as a function of the total field of psychological 
forces: individual and environmental) orientations. 
With the location of interactionist arguments established in rela-
tion to the various alternative theoretical arguments, as well as a 
statement of some of the more ultimate needs of these theoretical argu-
ments, the remainder of this chapter will attempt to define the major 
parameters of the present study. The several critical comments, theo-
retical and research innovations .and the results, conclusions and impli-
cations of this study are all dedicated to the realization of the several 
general goal$ expressed in this section of the report. 
Statement of the Problem 
This research report, in seeking a theoretical as well as a meth-
odological clarification of the interactionist theory, will concentrate 
• 
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attention on the unscientifio character of several of the major inter-
actionist propositions, used in the theory. It follows, of course, that 
adequ~te theoretical propositions are based on precisely defined con-
cepts; without these, as is the case in the present interactionist liter-
ature, measurement and systematic observation are precluded. In view of 
this circumstance, the first objective, besides explicitly identifying 
the reasons for the present methodological inadequacies, will become one 
of correcting this situation by the introduction and elucidation of 
several definitions, designed to accoi:nmodate the severai reasons observed 
for the postulated inadequacy. This theory construction will result in 
the statement of two primary research questions, the answers to which 
will focus direct attention on the viability of the earlier arguments of 
the report. 
In precise terms, after a review of the interactionist literature, 
via the two major schools (Chicagoan and Iowan) characterizing the per-
spective, a dilei:nma will be shown to beco~e evident. This dilemma is 
essentially a recognition that by following one school of thought, the 
Chicagoan, one will have a very complete social psychological explana-
tion, albeit, not a very empirically relevant one; by following the 
Iowan school of thought, however, one will have an empirically relevant 
theoretical statement, albeit, a not so complete social psychological 
explanation. 
At this point the problem will become manifest. It will be shown 
that what is needed is a rationale that preserves the essence of the 
Chicagoan theoretical contribution but which at the same time accommo-
dates a more complete and precise empirical understanding of the con-
structs and propositions of the theory, such as is attempted, despite 
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its failing, by the Iowans. Stated explicitly, the problem of this 
research report is: (1) the introduction of a theoretical statement 
(called Io-Chicagoanism), an argument which will allow not only a cred-
ible ontological description and explanation of human behavior, but 
which will also allow a systematic means for empiricizing this ontologi-
cal description and explanation; and (2) the appLLcation of a rigorous 
research methodology to this argument, to show the greater empirical 
relatedness of the argument, relative to that of either the Chicagoan or 
Iowan arguments. The latter task will involve the collection of a series 
of self identifications, their attitudinal basis, and the creation of 
experimental interactional situations. Each of these procedures will 
serve the goal of operationalizing the major constructs of the theoreti-
cal statements. Subsequently, the actual research data will be collect-
ed, via a procedure designed to tap the actual nature and extent of the 
symbolic interaction, thereby identifying the relative empirical sup-
port, obtaining for the three theoretical interactionist perspectives. 
CHAPTER II 
CHICAGOAN AND IOWAN SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM 
Introduction 
The sequestered character of the interpretations and explanations 
of the symbolic interactionist theoretical orientation has too long been 
made viable by the commonly held, somewhat institutionalized assumption 
of the nonresearchability of interactionist arguments. Indeed, if saying 
it makes it so, then no greater evidence need be mustered, than observa-
tion of the history of the development of symbolic interactionist theory, 
especially as it is relevant to social psychological explanations. These 
remarks are made all the more discerning by observing the initial com-
ments of contemporary symbolic interactionist writers (those few who 
have refused the acceptance of the relegation of interactionist theory 
to a philosophical rationale). Miyamoto (1959: 51) begins his article 
with the statement: "The interactionist point of view in social psy-
chology was for some time mainly a framework of suggestive concepts ••• ;" 
Videbeck (1960: 351) notes that: "The view that one's self conception 
is learned from the. reactions of other individuals has achieved wide ac-
ceptance in social psychology, but its implications have not been much 
exploited empirically. 111 In quite direct terms, Kuhn (1964c: 5) observes 
1This observation is not to negate the few (and recently increasing) 
studies that have attempted to make an empirical comment on the interac-
tionist arguments, as unreflective of the gestalt of the argument as 
they are. For example: s. F. Miyamoto ands. Dornbusch (1956); M. Maehn, 
J. Mensing, ands. Nafager (1962); E. L. Quarantelli and J. Cooper 




that despite contemporary yearnings for emphasis on the advisability of 
research, the perspective (symbolic interaction) is quite haunted by in-
abilities to "close the gaps and distortions that so often lie between 
the imaginative theoretical model •.• and the operations used to investi-
gate the empirical world.'' In fact, it is possible to ask with Kuhn if 
all social investigation is "to be limited to the ambiguities and impre-
cisions of Einfuhlung and Verstehen?" Unlike the early introspectionist, 
studying his own experience or attempting to accommodate his experience 
with that of others, interactionist arguments must move toward making 
inferences about the experiences of other persons from their verbal re-
ports or from their responses to carefully structured situations. 
Measurement is commonly accepted as the assignment of numbers of 
objects (events) according to rules (Stevens, 1946). It is not hard to 
understand measurement used in natural science, such as length and 
weight, but such common sense understandings often are absent in the 
measurement of individual and/or group phenomena (such as: socio-economic 
status, intelligence, and mental processes). However, the same proce-
dure is operative, and if rules can b.e stated, then the implication for 
the measurement of anything is at least theoretically, possible (Lund-
berg, 1939: 68). The above is just one avenue for quantification. 
There is always the avenue of merely counting. In fact, the mere accom-
modation of a frequency count to the data can be used with sophisticated 
analytical methodologies and can result in quite scientifically plausi-
ble deductions and corollary implications. 
The explicitness of the above statements is demanded in the light 
of the theoretical, substantive and empirical goals of this research. 
Such concerns demonstrate the interrelated, intertwined relation between 
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the two major purposes of this study, a methodologi~al as well as a 
theoretical contribution to the development of the isymbolic interaction-
ist tradition. These issues compel attention, after any serious histor-
ical review of the development of symbolic interactionist arguments. 
The historical content (in all of its manifest and latest consequences 
and its complexities and contradictions) of the argument is easiest 
identified by dichotomizing it (the argument) into two theoretical and/or 
research trends: the Chicagoan and Iowan interactionist trends (Meltzer 
and Petras, 1970). The complexities and contradictions, made manifest 
by this dichotomous approach, not only reflect the historical content of 
the argument, but are reflective of current dialogue, as well. For ex-
ample, Huber's recent arguments (1973: 466) purporting that: "Mead pro-
vides a way to formulate important aspects of social psychological 
problems but suggests few actual problems for investigation. Some of 
his most relevant premises are untestable •.• ", indeed mirror the initial 
comments of this report. In fact, the series of comments exchanged by 
J. Huber (1973); R. L. Schmitt (1974); G. P. Stone, D.R. Maines, H. A. 
Farberman, G. I. Stone, and N. K. Denzin (1974); and J. Huber (1974) 
may be taken as contemporary evidence of the conclusions resulting from 
a historical understanding of interactionist arguments via the dichotom-
ous procedure, discussed above. 
Review of the Literature 
The Chicagoan Symbolic Interactionist 
George Herbert Mead's philosophical thoughts have long permeated 
and in fact have been the very initiators and sustainers of the life of 
symbolic interactionist theory; therefore, it is possible to agree with 
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Morris' (1934: ix-xii) interpretation of Mead (scientifically, at least) 
as a social psychologist: 
Philosophically, Mead was a pragmatist; scientifically, he was 
a social psychologist ••. Mead adds little or nothing to the 
corpus of the facts of the social sciences as determined by 
distinctive methods of investigation; to the ideational and 
conceptual structure he adds much. 
Of course, this recognition is not to deny the contributions of James 
(1890), Cooley (1922) and Thomas (1923). For example, with the work of 
James, Martindale (1960: 339) finds a convenient beginning point in 
tracing the development of symbolic interaction. 
For the present exposition, however, if one follows the beginning 
lines of thought in Mind, Self and Society, it is possible to witness 
the initial concern of this paper in its budding. The total and diverse 
influence of Darwinian theory on the 19th century interpretation of 
reality in all of the sciences is quite evident. This is an observation 
that needs little explication; succinctly, this references Darwin's in-
dications that humankind is a mere acting organism whose constitution 
and behavior are governed by sets of natural laws. This influence 
upon Mead is noted by Morris (1934: x): 
It has been the philosophical task of pragmatism to reinter-
pret the concepts of mind and intelligence in the biological, 
psychological and sociological terms which post-Darwinian 
currents of thought have made prominent, and to reconsider the 
problems and task of philosophy from the new standpoint ... the 
outlines of an empirical naturalism •.. which aims to avoid the 
inherited dualisms of mind and matter, experience and nature •.. 
It is a philosophy which opposes the other worldliness of the 
reason •.. and ••• mind •.. 
Continuing, Morris observes, "In many ways the most secure and imposing 
result of pragmatic activity to date has been its theory of intelligence 
and mind ... elaboration of this theory defines the life-long activity of 
Mead." This, besides clarifying the complementarity of the initial com-
9 
ments, brings one squarely in the face of the more theoretical concern 
of this paper. The essence of Mead's life-long activity was his fight 
against the pre-Darwinian rationalized erudiction of the split between 
the organism arid the environment. For Mead, the organism and his en-
vironment were mutually determinate; that is, the activity of the organ-
.ism is a function of his environmental nexus, just as the environmental 
nexus is a function of the activity of the organism. The emphasis pres-
ently, of course, is with the former determinate, that is, the activity 
of the organism as a function of his environmental nexus. It is the 
explication of this interest that enables the possibility of the syste-
matic summarization of much of Mead's work. 
As in any novel situation, extremities of behavior in reaction to 
it are quite commonplace. This is no less so for the scientist, philoso-
pher, and/or any other reality interpreter. For example, cognizance may 
be taken of the behavioristic attempts at understanding these natural 
laws that were thought to exist and to characterize animate as well as 
inanimate objects. Extremity in reaction to Darwinist thought, for be-
haviorists, took the form of the development of a definition calling for 
the precise measurement and observation of all objects of study. Grant-
ing that many of their assumptions (and therefore much of their work) 
were crude and questionable, Mead sought a less extreme reaction to the 
Darwinian research implications. First, Mead believed that the scope of 
behaviorism could be extended to include introspective phenomena, a 
point on which much of his criticism of the behaviorists rested. Thus, 
Mead contended that the behaviorists were only considering the external 
aspect of the total behavior of the organism. As a corollary, Mead re-
jected the tenet that organisms passively respond to stimuli; rather, 
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organisms may dynamically select their stimuli; they may structure their 
own environment just as that environment may also structure their being. 
Thus, Mead's adaptation to the Darwinian influence (methodologically, 
and in terms of the relation between mind and body) is one of a more 
moderate stance than that of the behaviorist; rather, he espoused a 
"social behaviorist" approach. Indeed, behaviorism had its beginning in 
animal behaviorism in which only the overt behavior of the animal could 
be known. Actually, this may not be the only behavior characterizing 
the organism; perhaps there are language symbols, known only to the per-
son having them. This is behavior, albeit, it is not observable to 
others, and it must be taken into consideration in any convincing account 
of human behavior. 
Mead began the construction of his "social behaviorism" by consider-
ing the function of gestures in social acts. An idea represents an un-
observable stage in an ongoing act directed toward some environmental 
object. Before any explicit (observable) behavior obtains, an implicit 
(nonobservable) behavior obtains, an internal organization and prepara-
tion for the developing overt act. Interpreting Mead further, Desmonde 
(1957: 55) notes that by the interpretability of these inner behavioral 
patterns as such, it becomes possible to construct a naturalistic theory 
of introspection. 
It is possible to speak of the distinction between symbolic and non-
symbolic interaction. Thus, Mead notes the "conversation of gestures" 
as representing the social situation in its most simple form, an intra-
individual mental process in which a gesture on the part of one individu-
al evokes a preparatory movement on the part of the second person, and 
this gesture on the part of the second calls out a response in the for-
11 
mer, etc. This essentially involves the perception of a situation (re~l 
or otherwise) and then subsequently counter "interpretations" of it, 
until the situation is adequately defined. The processual nature here 
described does not necessarily portray the full complexity of a perceiv-
ed social situation, a complexity which serves as the distinction between 
subhuman and human social action and as a corollary, symbolic (the use 
of significant gestures, just described; "inner" interdependent cogni-
tions representing the reaction of other persons to cognized behavioral 
intentions and actual subsequent behavior) and nonsymbolic (use of non-
significant gestures) gestures. This involves an "inner incorporated 
social process," whereby the consequences of actions are already present 
while the behavior develops. Furthermore, the capacity of the later 
phases of this mental act to control the earlier stages makes the drgan-
ism an intelligent being, rather than a mere reacting organism, an as-
sumption popular among the behaviorists. 
The primary medium for this distinction between the symbolic and 
nonsymbolic is language, for symbolic interaction requires that one in-
teractant be capable of intra-individually responding to his or her own 
responses in the same way as he perceives that any other interactant may 
respond to the same response. The necessity, therefore, exists for the 
first interactant to have the same response possibilities as has the 
perceived second, third, etc. interactant(s). Additionally, the capa-
bilities must exist for interactant one to be able to respond to his own 
responses through the use of some sense modality in the same way as in-
teractant two, three, etc. It is language that meets those conditions, 
for one can mentally hear.what he says, and thus evoke within himself 
the same ideas (preparat:i,on·s to act) as are evoked' in the other person. 
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For example, by means of verbal response, an individual can simultaneous-
ly respond as would the other, while at the same time evoking the other's 
response by his action. 
Through the person's capacity to use symbols and to interact sym-
bolically, any.one interactant can respond to his own behavior as he 
perceives some particular other or others would (i.e., he can take the 
role of the other)~ for Mead, "mind" was the term which applies to this 
process. Thus the mind emerges in the social act when the person is 
able to obtain c9gnitions of the perspective of the other individual, 
and hence is able to check his initial responses via his knowledge of 
the response of the concerned other to his own response. Mead (1934: 
134) states: 
It is by means of reflexiveness--the turning back of the exper-
ience of the individual upon himself--that the whole social 
process is thus brought into the experience of the individuals 
involved in it •.• Reflexiveness, then, is the essential condi-
tion within the social process, for the development of mind. 
It is only one step further to seeing the possibility of "common 
shared perspectives," indeed, to seeing an integrated and/or set of 
shared integrated (or not so integrated) inner representations of outer 
reality. It is through the internalization of these organized attitudes 
of the entire group that the individual develops a complete self. The 
cooperative processes of society are possible only insofar as individuals 
can carry within themselves the numerous roles of the other people in-
volved in group situations. 
Implied in the foregoing is a certain complexity, not yet adequate-
ly described, as Mead sees it. Therefore, he references this internaliz-
ed role of the other within any one person as the "Me." It is through 
this concept that it is possible to infer the potential influence of 
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social definitions upon individual behavior. The corresponding adjusted 
response of the interactant to the perceived other's definition is the 
"I." "The "I" is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the 
others; the "Me" is the organized set of attitude'S of others which one 
himself assumes (Mead, 1934: 175) ." 
A theoretical provision for individual "freedom and dignity" is thus 
allowed the acting organism; he does not merely respond to outside in-
fluences, neither does he blindly follow his role definitions. Accord-
ing to Mead, innovation always can arise through the readjustment of the 
original ongoing act to the "Me;" the "I" is the source of all novelty 
and individuality, for it is by this readjustment that new social forms 
come into being. The world of interpersonal relations is, therefore, 
in a continual state of change via the interaction between the "I" arl.d 
"Me." Indeed, it is· in the fusion of the "I" and "Me" that cognizance 
may be taken of the fullest development of Mead's solution to the Dar-
winian implications concerning the dualistic relation of the environment 
and the organism. This is the major factor allowing the systematic and 
exhaustive intelligibility of Mead's work. 
A theoretically giant step (in terms of Mead) is thus taken for the 
social psychological exposition of human behavior, perhaps the greatest 
of which is cognizance of an inner forum, incorporated inside individu-
als, representing outer reality. It is the argument of the present 
author that there is a great importance for preserving the basic struc-
ture of this essential proposition. 
Contemporarily, Blumer (1969: 3-5) quite explicitly retains this 
essential position in his third proposition: 
•.• meanings (symbols) are handled in and modified through an 
interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the 
things he encounters •.• [thus] while the meaning of things is 
formed in the context of social interaction and is derived by 
the person from that interaction, it is a mistake to think 
that the use of meaning by a person is but an application of 
the meaning so derived .•. the use of meanings ... occurs through 
a process of interpretation .•• First, the actor indicates to 
himself the things toward which he is acting .•. The making of 
such indications is an internalized social process in that 
the actor is interacting with himself ••. Second, by virtue of 
this process of communication with himself, interpretation 
becomes a matter of handling meanings. The actor selects, 
checks, suspends, regroups and transforms the meanings in the 
light of the situation in which he is placed ••. 
Thus, the preservation of the "inner forum" (a reflexive process in 
which the actor makes indications to himself, notes things, and deter-
mines the anticipated consequences for his behavior) is maintained by 
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Blumer. Much of the same is interpretable from Denzin (1970 a,b), how-
ever, without further statements from him, it would be premature to 
exactly interpret his theoretical position. 
Despite the notation of the theoretical importance of the Meadian 
proposition, fashioned by Mead and preserved by Blumer(the two major 
representatives of what Meltzer and Petras (1970: 3-6) refer to as the 
"Chicagoan school" of the symbolic interactionist theory), it is scien-
tifically essential that convincing empirical substantiation of the 
proposition be elucidated. It is the general feeling of the present 
writer, as well as others (Kuhn and his followers; cf. McPartland and 
Cumming, 1958; Garretson, 1962; Vernon, 1962), that this aspect of the 
endeavor is seriously limited. If primary credit can be accorded to 
Mead for origination of the proposition, then a primary indictment can 
also be accorded him for his unclear definitions of the major concepts 
of this proposition, particularly that of the "I". This is the prime 
reason for the nonresearchability of symbolic interactionist hypotheses. 
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Methodologists concur that good definitions are essential to proper 
measurement. This is necessarily implied if, in fact, there is to exist 
an isomorphism between the quantitative definition and its qualitative 
referent. Ergo, a more refined definition is needed if the constructs 
of the Chicagoan proposition are to be made researchable. Meltzer (1964: 
20) states: 
Mead's position can .•. be critized from a •.• standpoint ..• of 
methodology. First of all, Mead's theory for the most part 
does not seem to be highly researchable, as yet little truly 
significant research has been conducted chiefly in terms of 
his frame of reference. 
This argument is the basis for the initial explicitness of concern with 
methodology and the anticipated methodological goals of this research. 
Resulting, then, is a need for a theoretical refinement, in view of the 
necessity for the definitional clarification of the central terms, which 
must obtain in order to accomplish this methodological advancement. This 
is certainly not to imply a theory made subservient to methodological 
techniques, as will be evidenced. 
The Iowan Symbolic Interactionist 
Manford Kuhn has perceived the ambiguity of the definition and 
corresponding lack of researchability of the "I" construct in the Chica-
goan proposition. His attempts at the clarification of it have essen-
tially led to his dismissal of the concept altogether. While not denying 
the covert facets of human behavior, the Iowa school (the second major 
school in the symbolic interactionist tradition) emphasizes the objective 
and empirical verifiability of scientific productions. Referencing his 
thoughts as "self" theory, Kuhn (l964a: 55) states: 
It was my intention ••• to employ a term which would not so much 
differentiate an emerging point of view from the more or less 
orthodox ideas of symbolic interaction as it would enable, on 
the other hand, a distinction between a body of conjectural 
and deductive orientations--a.s represented by Cooley, Dewey and 
Mead--and a derivative but developing set of generalizations, 
tested by empirical research. 
However, upon closer analysis, the viability of this perspective in 
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Kuhn's (the major proponent in the Iowan school of symbolic interaction) 
thought has in many ways dictated a theoretical position divorced of the 
central "interpretative" essence of the Chicagoan proposition, an essence 
earlier noted as an essential in the social psychological explanation of 
human behavior. For example, Kuhn and Hickman (1956: 43) have defined 
the "self" operationally as the responses subjects make to the self-
directed question: "Who Am I?" Theoretically, this references the self 
as "the individual attitudes (plans of action) toward his own mind and 
body, viewed as an object" (Kuhn and Hickman, 1956: 43)~ at a later 
point in Kuhn's writings, and at a conceptually clearer level, the self 
is seen as referring to the individual's view of himself as a social 
object among social objects (Kuhn, 1964b: 629). The operational mani-
festation of this conceptual statement is to be represented by twenty 
self defining statements from the person of interest. Tucker (1966: 
345) notes the following assumptions predicating the test, generally 
known as the Twenty Statements Test (TST) : 
(1) The person will refer the question "Who Am I?" to himself 
and not to anyone else. (2) The person is aware (knows) of 
himself and he puts this "knowledge" into words. (3) The 
person's awareness of himself is dependent upon the behavior 
of others in a situation and not a matter, of "traits" or in-
stincts. (4) The person's awareness of himself precludes the 
use of any fixed responses~ the responses must be the person's 
own plan of action. (5) The responses to the question are 
not limited to the testing situation, but have applicability 
in a variety of situations. 
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These assumptions are quite suggestive of a diluting of the Chicag-
oan proposition, especially assumption five; it is not until the analyti-
cal procedures are applied to the subject's answers that an explicit 
portrayal of the compromise of the original proposition is manifested. 
Additionally, Denzin (1970a: 416) questions the static measurement of 
the self implied by Iowan research. He states: 
Unless a panel design, with its measures on the same sample of 
selves is employed, the test ["Who Am I?"] does not measure 
the self as a set of tentative attitudes that are being con-
tinually redefined •.. 
McPhail and Tucker (1972) express the same view, noting the incon-
sistency between verbalized self theory (as it will be subsequently 
outlined) and its associated research. In passing, a recent study 
(Mahoney, 1973), examining the day-to-day stability (nonstability} in 
the responses to the "Who Am I?" (TST) test, indicates that some identi-
fications are stable across situations, while others ~re not. Kuhn's 
anticipation of this fact may be directly responsible for his own in-
consistent handling of the problem. 
All of the "Who Am I?" statements not identified by the analyst as 
consensual statements (statements requiring no further explanation to 
be understood, i.e., generating consensus with regard to the behavior 
that anyone would take with reference to the object so identified, that 
is, statements referring to groups and classes whose limits and condi-
tions of membership are matters of common knowledge (Kuhn and McPart-
land, 1954) are considered as subconsensual. These latter statements 
refer to group attributes, traits, or other objects requiring further 
explication by the respondnet in order to be understandable by anyone. 
An example might be: "I am a bad boy;" there is little consensus as to 
the meaning of the identified object. That is, states Tucker (1966: 
352) : 
... others will not know how to behave consistently toward ob-
jects which are identified in these terms. This ... is the 
direct opposite of the interpretation for consensual state-
ments .•• Those objects which are identified in a consensual 
fashion will elicit the same responses from all who come in 
contact with them. 
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This reasoning, although lacking in systematic research qualities 
{i.e., How does one {the investigator) know that the statement: "I am 
a woman" refers to a group whose conditions of membership are matters of 
common knowledge; more will be said on this matter in a later chapter.), 
is quite consistent with Mead's discussion of the necessity for dis-
tinguishing between the subjective {Kuhn's subconsensual) and the self 
conscious {Kuhn's consensual). Experiences which secure objective 
reference are labelled objective; experiences failing to secure objec-
tive reference are subjective {private). It is Mead's contention that 
the self which is viewed as an object as the individual looks on others 
as objects is of the former nature. Mead never unambiguously nor defin-
itely elucidates the content of the subjective experience. At one 
point, however, he states that the affective side of experience is 
mostly subjective. This is because: 
The attitudes of which affection is a part so largely deter-
mine our conduct in place of the actually objective charac-
ters which are responsible for them. Whenever we do a thing 
just because we want to, we are confessedly subjective ... 
Imagery is largely subjective because we depend upon our re-
sponses to imagery ..• to determine how we would act ..• {Mead, 
1934: 18). 
These "would be parts" of the individual's total experience are, 
for Kuhn, statements from the person which would require further explan-
ation in order to be understood by others. At this point, the relevance 
of Cooley's (1922) third proposition (the self-feeling, consequent of 
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using others to judge the appropriateness of one's behavior) of the 
"looking glass self" becomes interpretable and its distinctiveness from 
the first two of his propositions becomes evident. It is also along 
these theoretical lines that restrictions on what shail legitimately be 
called self definitions are understandable; therefo~e, while the state-
ment "I am a student" is permissible, the statement "I am intelligent" 
is not. This essentially is a restriction in the cognitive (content) 
attitudinal aspect of self attitudes, as will be subsequently shown. 
One should expect that this subjective experience will have some influ-
ence on behavior; however, the present concern is "behavior as it is in-
formed by a social self." 
The theoretical connection thus becomes manifest; the consensually 
identified person is "socially anchored," so the speak. Such a person 
can expect anyone to behave toward him in a similar manner. "If that is 
so, it is further reasoned, that those with the largest number of con-
sensual statements have behaved in a greater number of different situa-
tions" (Tucker, 1966: 354), thus the idea of social anchoring. 
Via aspects of the Guttman scaling technique, Kuhn is able to es-
tablish: (1) the differential saliency of the consensual to the subcon-
sensual statements (i.e., the type of statements elicited first by the 
respondent), thus; (2) an individual's "locus score" equals the number 
of consensual references he makes (i.e., 1 to 20, depending on the num-
ber of such statements made out of the total possible twenty statements). 
With this precisely structured methodology, Kuhn assumes that he 
has indeed accommodated a theoretical as well as a methodologically 
viable concatenation for representing the social science perspective. 
He says (Kuhn and Hickman, 1956: 133): 
The social science view is that people organiz~ and direct 
their behavior in terms of their subjectively Befined identi-
fications. These, in turn, are seen as internalizations of 
the objective social statuses they occupy ••• Our test elicits 
these self definitions. 
Symbolic interaction, as far as representing the process of "de-
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fining the situation" in anticipation of behavior, becomes for Kuhn, the 
internalized expectations of at least one other reciprocal role. 
For every role he comes to play, he assumes at least one other 
reciprocal role; this dual process permits him to see objects 
from the point of view of both the plan of action that is his 
role and the plan of action that he conceives to be the role 
of the reciprocal other (Kuhn and Hickman, 1956: 36). 
The clarity of the distinction between the implied separableness 
of the plans of action associated with the two roles is troublesome, to 
begin with. · It would seem that the two roles are quite correlated in 
view of contemporary definitions of roles as being shared expectations 
about the proper behavior associated with positions among the callee-
tive. This leaves less than a little room for any innovativeness in 
behavior. Meltzer and Petras (1970) have noted the similarity of the 
Iowan perspective with conventional role theory. They note that the 
self becomes solely a "Me". Though the present writer is not in full 
agreement with Meltzer and Petras' interpretation of Kuhn's theoretical 
modifications, it shows the ambiguities which presently characterize 
the Iowan interpretation of symbolic interaction. The point advanced 
here is that an individual's behavior (for whom a stable set of self 
definitions has been obtained) is to be explained only in terms of the 
reciprocal role other(s) and their associated expectations on his be-
havior. Thus, indeed, the person symbolically defines the situation 
before acting, just as the Chicagoans suppose, but this definition is 
lacking in the interaction component, especially if the situation con-
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tains only one reciprocal role other. A more appropriate designation 
would be to use Kuhn's idea that the individual rehearses to himself 
the situationally called for "plans of action", before acting. In this 
context, a person mechanically moves (rehearses) from one self defini-
tion to the next, noting the fit with the role other definition. Such 
a conception is certainly not a theoretically convincing explanation of 
the symbolic interaction informing subsequent behavior. Further, it is 
not possible for the underlying self definitions to interact among 
themselves. 
One additional interpretation, implied by much of Kuhn's writings, 
is the necessity for the situational presence of the reciprocal role 
other(s) before their represented "plans of actions" can influence the 
individual's behavior. If indeed this is the case, restriction on the 
variability and range of the content of the symbolic interaction is 
suggested. This issue is confused, however, for at one point Kuhn and 
Hickman (1956: 37) observe: 
By means of internal conversation, the individual tries out 
one possible plan of action after another, deriving from his 
(imaginary) conversation the probable views of reciprocal 
others regarding the alternative roles that he might play. 
In this interior conversation, he may find one role that 
would appear to be satisfactory in the light of what he knows 
about the attitudes of his reciprocal others. 
Although his confused use of the term "role other" remains, one per-
ceives (especially as an attempt is made to incorporate the applicabil-
ity of the TST identifications) the possibility of a much larger range 
of content for internal rehearsing in an attempt to define the situa-
tion. Intuitively, this latter interpretation permits a much more via-
ble interpretation of behavior, but it still subsumes to the initial 
criticism. The person in the end, no matter how much rehearsing he en-
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gages, will behave in terms of the inferred situational role definition. 
In Kuhn's terms, he finds and operates upon the one self definition 
that would appear to be satisfactory in the light of what he knows about 
the attitudes of his reciprocal others. If he perceives the attitudes 
of others to be congruent with one of his self definitions, one can ex-
pect the latter to be the content of the definition of situation, ac-
cording to the more liberal interpretation of Kuhn. The essence of 
symbolic interaction becomes reduced to a mechanistic substitution of 
internalized role definitions, theoretically; operationally, as is evi-
dent from the earlier discussion, this reductionism becomes even more 
pronounced. In other words, the Iowan interpretation, although suggest-
ing a number of symbolic substitutions, in the enil involves only one 
definition in the guidance of behavior. 
The present author proposes that Kuhn's manner of dealing with the 
role of these several incorporated self definitions (as mentalistic in-
teraction components) is comparable to the way in which Mead dealt with 
the "I" component of the mentalistic interaction. That is, as Mead so 
diligently conceptualized the "Me" and in the end recognized his fail-
ure to incorporate the individual, so Kuhn, as he so diligently worked 
on the empirical observability of the "Me", recognized his failure to 
incoprorate the individual. For Mead, the problem was solved by theo-
retically attaching a qualifatory "I" concept to his well developed 
scheme. Kuhn, on the other hand, theoretically attached his empirically 
relevant "self" conceptualization to the immediate role that the person 
was playing. This qualified the role behavior of the person, creating 
a nonfunctional intervening link between the role expectation and the 
behavior. The end result, however, is role determinacy because the 
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person uses that definition that corresponds to the role expectation to 
inform his behavior. Besides .the fact that little symbolic interaction 
is evidenced here, it is the present argument that little "role rehears-
ing" is evident. Indeed, all that need obtain is that the person recall 
the salient definitions, called for by the "role other." This auto-
matically obtains when the situation is perceived by the person; it fol-
lows that this perceived cognition informs the person of the applicable 
"definition of the situation", without his searching or rehearsing his 
several salient internalized self definitions. This results in the 
conclusion that Iowan symbolic interactionism involves the rehearsal of 
one definition, which results from the immediate situation of experience 
and behavior follows accordingly. This reduces the self, as it informs 
behavior, to a "Me", thus destroying any type of mentalistic interaction 
of the character and quality as that described by the Chicagoan propo-
sition. As a corollary, behavioral explanations and predictions in 
terms of the original Meadian proposition are completely altered. 
In order to fully grasp the reason and motivations of Kuhn's 
branching from the Meadian (Chicagoan) proposition, it may be helpful 
to examine the intellectual setting of which Kuhn was a product. Petras 
and Meltzer (1970: 3-17) note Kuhn's exposure to the Meadian perspective 
by Kimball Young, at the University of Wisconsin, 1934 to 1941. Other 
concomitant influences were the writings of Gustav Bergman's logical 
positivism and Kenneth Spence's positivistic orientation in the philos-
ophy of science. The impact of these influences is readily apparent in 
Kuhn's works, an impact seemingly (for Kuhn) necess.:j.tating a compromise 
of the Chicagoan proposition. Thus, Kuhn (1964a) is motivated to write 
of the methodologically operational demonstrability of symbolic inter-
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actionism, a concern for which the Chicagoan perspective was criticized. 
While not explicitly (theoretically) denying the more sequestered as-
pects of the Chicagoan proposition of human behavior, Kuhn (and his 
.school of followers) emphasized doubly the necessity for objective and 
credible indices of this subjective, as well the need for the objective 
study of behavior. This is a statement with which the present writer 
is in total agreement. But as in most cases, actions speak louder than 
words; thus, in his (Kuhn's) self theory, the self becomes operationally 
defined as nothing more than the answers to the question of "Who Am I", 
and upon inspection, represents a sure compromise of the original propo-
sition. Observes Petras and Meltzer (1.970: 7), " ••• Kuhn sought to 
empiricize Mead's ideas by reconceptualizing or abandoning those he deem-
ed nonempirical and by developing techniques of observation that were 
consistent with this aim." It is by default that it is possible to wit-
ness the Iowan's rejection of the structural essence of the Chicacjoan 
proposition, as they attempt to grapple with the empirical intelligibil-
ity of the perspective. The "self" for the followers of Mead, charac-
terized as it is; by a processual nature, is laid to rest. Blurner's 
third proposition explicitly stated the temporariness of any type of 
behavior. Mead consistently spoke of a novel, creative, unpredictable 
aspect of behavior as informed by the self. The Iowans take no method-
ologically explicit cognizance of this impulsive aspect, and as a corol-
lary, of the "I" and "Me" interaction components. The relevant answer 
to the question "Who Am I" for Kuhn denotes the self only in terms of 
his social position, thus a person may answer the question by making 
responses such as: "I am woman". If there is knowledge of the actor's 
reference groups (orientational other(s), according to Kuhn (1964c), 
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predictions of his self attitudes is possible and if there is knowledge 
of his self attitudes, predictions of his behavior are conceivable. 
This view, as noted disposes of the "I", and in so doing, ignores what 
Meltzer and Petras speak of as the processual character of the self; 
however, it does seek preservation of the scientific goals of the per-
spective. 
At the same time, the central constructs in the original proposi-
tion, and as it was subsequently explained and interpreted by Blumer, 
are of a totally ambiguous nature in terms of concise definitions, 
thereby militating against any rigorous treatment. Undoubtably, this 
is a function of the fragmentary interpretations and formulations of 
the Meadian perspective by his followers. Nevertheless, many of the 
central concepts are quite vague. For example, Kolb (1944: 242) refers 
to the "I" concept as a vaguely defined residual category. Mead some-
what more clearly specifies the nature of the "Me", but in effect, deals 
with the "I" qualitatively in much the same way that Kuhn deals with it 
both qualitatively and quantitatively. Nevertheless, he does conceive 
of the concept thereby avoiding a deterministic explanation of behavior, 
as Kuhn fails to do. 
CHAPTER III 
IO-CHICAGOAN SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM 
Introduction 
A dilemma is thus made explicit. Wallace (1971) speaks of the two 
sides of science: Good theory and/or theoretical derivations from re-
search and good research and/or verification of theory. An explanation 
divorced of empirical support becomes philosophy, while research divorced 
of accurate hypotheses can never describe ontological reality, but onl}' 
epistemological reality. The dilemma as seen by this writer can be 
summarily observed in Table I. 
TABLE I 
THE RELATION OF THEORY, SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONIST 





















Cells "b", "c", and "d" respectively, have b:een elucidated in an 
explicit and/or implicit fashion in the previous 3ection of this paper. 
From their consideration, a deduction was generated explicating the 
above portrayed Table I in terms of a major dilemma. It is the purpose 
of this section to lay a foundation for the theoretical erasure of that 
dilemma. Needed is a rationale that preserves the essence of the 
Chicagoan exposition as well as one that allows the empirical elucida-
tion of this improved exposition, thus the "needed" content of cell "a". 
Attention has already been called to the ambiguity of the self 
(especially the "I" construct) as formulated by Mead. Blumer essential-
ly continues the Meadian tradition as far as the conceptualization of 
the self is concerned. However, as noted, other authors because of the 
flexibility of the term (Kolb, 1944; Kuhn and Hickman, 1956) have been 
able to arrive at variable interpretations of this concept. Indeed, 
Petras and Meltzer (1972) speak of the Dramaturgical and the Ethno-
methodological orientation as being variants of the interactionist posi-
tion. The present objective is in no way one of offering a synthesis 
of the various interpretations, neither is it an attempt of the writer 
to suggest an interpretation of the original Meadianproposition. Rather, 
the objective is one of theory construction, itself; a new more credible 
perspective is sought, one retaining the "structural essence" of the 
original proposition, but at the same time adding a necessary and suf-
ficient definitional preciseness to allow the researchability of the 
proposition. 
This vagueness, this ambiguity, etc., which persistently presents 
itself may, perhaps, be most cogently dealt with by investigating a 
broader perspective. Theoretically, it is said that behavior is a 
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function of the person and the environment, that is: B = P X E, where P 
(Person) most parsimoniously refers to the person's unique psychological 
state and/or states. In fact, attitudes are most generally accepted as 
predispositions to act in affirmative or negative ways with respect to 
some psychological object--where this psychological object may be a 
symbol, person, institution, ideal, idea, etc. Indeed, the usual way of 
inferring the psychological state of a person with resepct to one of his 
psychological objects is via an attitude scale. Therefore, it is felt 
justified in operationally speaking of the variable "person" as a set 
of attitudes reflecting on the psychological state (states) of some per-
son. E (Environment) in the above formulation is found necessary in 
view of the variability of behavior from one setting to the next. This 
latter construct (the situation) is most parsimoniously linked to the 
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person variable (his attitudes) via the person's definition of that 
situation. Thus, an ontological situation must be epistemologically 
constructed by the person in order to legitimately speak of behavior as 
a function of the situation and the person. Before this, of course, 
there is the implicit implication of perception, itself informed by 
various social factors. 
Though theoretically social psychologists note the formulation: 
B = P XE; as researchers, however, they tend to reduce this formulation 
to: B = P, i.e., attitudes. If one can only obtain a set of attitude 
scores from some person, then the prediction of his behavior is possible. 
This view persists, despite the inconsistency between attitudes and be-
havior that is well documented in the research literature (Wicker, 
1969; Vroom, 1964; Linn, 1965). Even within the interactionist tradi-
tion where the guiding principle of the early interactionist was that 
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individuals could not be understood apart from their social situations, 
Cottrell (1942) was stressing the neglected area of the "situation". 
Such should suggest the necessity of a close abiding by the initial 
formulation, an attempt which is being made by the Chicagoans, even 
though ambiguously. Mead, through his "Me" concept was very ably en-
dowed, theoretically, to consider this situational input into behavior. 
By stopping the theoretical elaboration at this point and applying the 
rationale to the empirical world, it would be supposed that prediction 
of behavior would accurately occur merely by knowing the situation with-
in which a person was to interact. Such is the implication one obtains 
from Kuhn. This is opposed to the processual behavioral formulation. 
Mead added a second construct to his system, the "I." It is the posi-
tion of this writer that basically (though possibly not in specifics) 
Mead was trying to accomplish the same thing by his "I" concept (to ex-
press individuality) as contemporary writers are by their "Person" con-
cept. Indeed, to use the variable, attitude, harmonizes very well with 
one's self conception as a social psychologist; thus, there is the as-
sumption of attitudes as being socially fashioned, though they are held 
by the person. Such a position moves from the more totally psychologi-
cal position of conceiving the person's behavior as a function of his 
·traits (where the latter usually references an enduring characteristic 
of the person, leading him to respond in a certain manner in all situa-
tions), another attempt to conceptualize the innovative and unpredictable 
in behavior, albeit a totally individualistic explanation. Here, room 
is made for the social (if it is made) only as an early and most often 
familial influence. Ergo, via the concept, attitude, movement several 
degrees toward systematically accounting for the social is made. 
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Indeed, such was a giant step, but the time has come for a more viable 
systematic accounting of the social (as well as the individualistic 
elements). The Chicagoans imply, armed with their "I" concept, that be-
havior is a function of: (1) social attitudes incorporated in an indiv-
idual; (2) these social attitudes will (how, one does not know) elicit 
a response of some type from the person. 
Most recently, Lindesmith and Strauss (1968: 320) in their attempt 
at the interpretation of this "I", express the idea that "no hard-and-
fast line can be drawn between our selves and the selves of others, 
since our selves exist only insofar as the selves of others." Indeed, 
Mead notes that one has as many selves as groups to which he belongs. 
However, common sense thinking runs counter to this understanding of the 
self, for individuality, here, calls for a concrete entity, thus because 
of the quite concrete observation of the encasement of the body and mind 
within a unity, it is seen as logically necessary that these are autono-
mous products. This is aggravated the more when "individuality" repre-
sents a basic component of the ethos of the culture, especially as it 
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becomes sanctioned by religion. However, there is no need to deny 
individuality in asserting the basic social nature of the self (i.e., 
as will be seen, the novelty as to which of the selves, corresponding 
to the groups to which one belongs, will be operative in any one situa-
tion is quite an unpredictable aspect of behavioral prediction). The 
nonrealization of this is possibly one grave factor in Mead's ambiguous 
use of the "I" concept. He easily perceived the logical integrativeness 
of the social in self development, as witnessed by his detailed, coher-
ent elaboration of it; indeed, its discussion is a major theme of his 
work as contrasted with his treatment of the "I" as a qualifier. This 
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qualifactory approach to discussing t.he "I" is quite possibly a reflec-
tion of the influance of the previously mentioned common sense approach. 
The only way for Mead to deal with this was the qualifactory use of the 
,;I." The writer merely offers this as a conjecture which is secondary 
to the major concern. 
Theoretical Development 
The following rationale offers an elucidation of the Chicagoan "I" 
concept, retaining the individuality aspect while at the same time 
asserting the social nature of it. It is possible to start with the 
idea that we have as many selves as groups to which we belong. This, 
for Mead, represents the social input; it is the "Me," i.e., the incor-
porated other(s). A moment's reflection of the natur~ of this "incor-
porated other" suggests in a substantive manner what was earlier refer-
red to as the epistemological construction of the ontological. The 
ontological references the social norms and attitudes which Mead so 
often refers to, which mediates interaction. Mead's use of the term 
here (as well as the seeming equality of social attitudes and social 
norms) varies somewhat from the thinking of contemporary writers, but 
it is not difficult to grasp his (Mead's) intentions; specifically, his 
use of the term "social attitudes of others" should be interpreted as a 
sociological construct, as opposed to being interpreted as a social 
psychological construct. Indeed, not until use is made of the term 
"incorporated attitude of others" does Mead move to this social psy-
chological level of explanation. It is this that is represented in the 
epistemological construction. This construction is well documented by 
Sherif (1936: 108): 
The psychological basis of the established social norms ••• con-
ventions, customs, and values, is the formation 9f ••• (a) frame 
of reference as a product of the contact of indiyiduals •. ~such 
frames of reference are established and incorporated in the 
individual, they enter as important factors to determine or 
modify ••• reactions to ... situations. 
This is the construction of the "Me" component of the self. 
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The present formulation retains these ideas and indeed retains the 
contentual nature of Mead's or the Chicagoan "Me" concept; however, it 
is with respect to the structural (where structural is used here to de-
note a location, a position, or a place in a system, for example, a 
mental system, consisting of mental positions, say, "individualistic 
cognitions" in one position and "others cognitions" in a second mental 
position) and functional relationships between the "I" and "Me 11 that a 
crucial reformulation is seen necessary. The writer will subsequently 
speak of the "content" of the "I" and the "Me" (incorporated other's 
definitions; attitudes), as well as a "structural relationship" between 
1 them. For purposes of clarity, the "I" is seen as holding the first of 
two mental positions, while the "Me" holds the second. This structure 
refers again to the "individualistic" and "social" Chicagoan mental 
positions; either position, of course, could be called position one or 
two. 
First, it is necessary to see the several incorporated selves as 
pre-existing within the psyche of the person, having accumulated through 
social relationships. These take the place, structurally, of Mead's 
"I." Thus, the "I" ·is erased from the present formulation. Instead, 
1Kolb, 1942, says that it is empty of content; actually, it is an 
ambiguous and ill-defined concept. 
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"mental position one" now has the content of Mead's '.'Me" construct, that 
is, a series of socially "incorporated others," i.e., that which some 
authors would refer to as "a series of socially developed selves," cor-
responding to the groups to which one (ego) cares about and what he 
feels that they ("others") think about him (ego). This content, instead 
of the term "Me," will now be referred to as the "Me Previous," rather 
than by the Chicagoan term, the "Me." In 'summary, "Me Previous" is thus 
seen as a series of incorporated social definitions from others (Iowan 
selves, i.e., this is the extent of the Iowan definition of the self), 
corresponding to the content of Mead's "Me," but, structurally, taking 
the place of Mead's labelled category, the "I". The "Me Previous" may 
be seen as "Me Previous,," where i refers to the specific "other defini-
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ti:on" that may be "called forth" at any particular time. The source of 
this "call" is referred to here as the "Me Present;" this latter takes 
the structural place (mental position two) of Mead's "Me;" content-wise, 
it has no co.hart in the Meadian rationale, just as Mead's "I" has no 
"explicit" cohort in the present formulation. This concept ("Me 
Present") will be elucidated shortly. 
The "Me Previous" component is a mere constelld.tion of attitudes, 
relevant to the various social experiences of the individual, accompanied 
by some motivational disposition. It holds that any one individual will 
have many sets of these, in fact, the total social psychological reality 
of the individual may be most parsimoniously ascertained in terms of his 
several characterizing psychological states; these are directly relevant 
to attitude scales. Among several social psychological circles of 
thought, attitudes are seen as having three aspects: the cognitive, the 
affective, and the behavioral. The reader may inunediately recognize 
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that the previous discussion forces attention directly to the cognitive 
aspect in the relation of the two concepts: self and attitudes, i;e., 
the present discussion is concerned only with mentalistic aspects of 
the self (cognitions; content of self) as they are responsible for be-
havior. This is not to reject the other of these attitudinal aspects 
as they are relevant to "attitudes toward one's self," but only to show 
their lack of importance in explaining "behavior as it is informed by a 
self." 
A brief detour at this point seems quite appropriate. Specifical-
ly, it is now possible to meaningfully explicate the previous phrase: 
"behavior as it informed by a self." Behavior informed by a self (a 
processual self; not a structured self nor a processual self having an 
"I" and "Me" component) says nothing about behavior informed by stable 
(enduring, i.e., energy level or possibly temperament) or unstable 
(temporary, i.e., failure to retrieve the ball to first base quickly 
because of a crippled ankle) individual biological characteristics 
and/or physical products (i.e., the ball player who slipped on a banana 
peel in the outfield, failing to retrieve the ball to first base). 
Though recognition of this fact makes the series of present comments 
still less deterministic, it does serve to make one aware of more \tiable 
avenues of research (social psychological or otherwise). With the ab-
sence of a "residual category" (the "I"), one is immediately faced with 
viably accounting for this potential variability in behavior, rather 
than relinquishing it to this "dumping ground" as does Young (1940: 
148). 
In terms of Mead's ambiguous discussion of the "I" and, in fact, 
much of the work of his followers who have been theoretically trapped 
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by this ambiguity, the above discussion adds to tl-ie hypothesis of the 
functionally useless nature of this concept. If ascertainment of the 
social source of behavioral innovativeness is the goal, then surely a 
more viable explanation is necessitated, thus the above reformulation. 
It would be a mistake of course to speak of the complete separableness 
of these two modes for conduct (behavior as a function of the self or 
as a function of bio-physical characteristics), for indeed, the more 
stable biological characteristics are apt to have a direct input into 
the content of the self. Kolb (1944: 242) notes that perhaps the bio-
logical could be social psychologically studied in terms of a constant. 
In line with Kuhn's attempt to deal with this ambiguity, he intro-
duces the possibility of the observation of the hypothesized operative 
concepts. The movement away from the observation of symbolic interac-
tion, in the Chicagoan sense has been elaborated; thus, the person is 
seen as directing his behavior in correspondence with one of his sub-
jectively held identifications, the one corresponding to the situated 
expectation of the role other(s). The Iowan paradigm must be seen as a 
sophisticated form of reductionism, comparable to a model which assumes 
that behavior is a function of only attitudes. Rather than explaining 
behavior by using attitudes about objects (people, events) outside the 
person, Iowans use attitudes about the person himself, as he views him-
self as an object. This is a by-product of the attitudes that one has 
about various objects. Indeed, the case is made for the incorporation 
of the situation (perceived role other(s) definitions); however, the 
immediately called for behavior is responded to automatically, by using 
the self definition demanded by the situation, as the informant of be-
havior. The internal symbolic interaction is absent; rather a limited 
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symbolic interaction can be seen as being used for the definition of 
the situation, and subsequently informing the appropriate behavior. 
Continuing the main trend of thought, it is possible to note in 
terms of this present conceptualization that in any one situation, it 
would be a gross oversimplification to think of a simple isomorphism 
existing between the various sets of attitudes and some resulting be-
havior in response to that situation. From pure common sense thinking, 
it is possible to think of "attitude set" conflicts, and their corollary 
emergent anxiety productions and/or hesitancy rea.ctions to the "situa-
tionally asked for behavior;" an automatic inference is that of some 
processual nature and subsequently variable behavior. 
The "Me Present" is the perceived situation at any particular time. 
As indicated, structurally, it takes the place of the Chicagoan "Me," 
however content-wise, it. is a mere perception factor. Thus an individu-
al coming home from a day's work, upon reaching home perceives a dif-
ferent situation than was perceived back on the assembly line. This 
perceived component is to .a "limited extent socially defined" by the 
mere act of perception. Waller (1961: 162-163) sees group products 
(group attitudes, mores, etc.) before their assimilation and/or incor-
poration into the self, as a pre-existing definition of the situation. 
This is what is initially perceived, but movement to another level is 
necessitated before the definition of the situation, as Thomas (1923) 
saw it, is intelligible, i.e., the "complete definition of the situa-
tion.112 This perception results in a cognitive component (the "Me 
2stebbins (1969) reflects the complexity of the processes involved 
in a complete "definition of the situation"; its full discussion is be-
yond the scope of the present study, however. 
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Present") which will subsequently be used as an interactional component 
in the "inner forum" with the relevant (i.e., "situationally called 
for") content of the "Me Previous," the result of which is finally a 
"complete definition of the situation." This is the nature of symbolic 
interaction, according to the Io-Chicagoan perspective. 
This is different from the Iowan perspective, for the latter ap-
proach sees a "complete definition of the situation" by the mere act of 
perceptual definition .without the subsequent processual generation of 
the self informing behavior. This, rather than the perceived situation 
itself (perceived role definition) or the individual attitude constella-
tion by itself, is the more parsimoniously accurate demonstration of 
the equation: B = P X E. Finally, the same may he indicated with re-
spec.t to the Chicagoan perspective. Indeed, Chicagoans describe a "com-
plete definition of the situation" as the result of a cognitive inter-
actional process; however, because of the utter ambiguous nature of one 
of the interactional components, the "I," and as a corollary, its pres-
ent empirico-theoretical status in the literature, this perspective is 
also found unacceptable. 
With this present conception, there is indeed a person and a situa-
tion; the person perceives the situation; this calls out a particular 
self or selves, some of which may be in conflict with reference to the 
perceived situation; there is an interaction between these selves and the 
perceived situation, a resultant of which is much self anguish, anxiety 
and concern, et cetera. The result of this interaction is a complete 
definition of the situation, which informs the appropriate behavior. 
Indeed, such a per$pective implies the social development and 
nature of the entirity of the self; at the same time it implies the 
uniqueness and .creativeness of the behavior to any situation, which 
reality shows to be the case. 
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The reader may now ask, what has been accomplished. Namely, a re-
fined theoretically intelligible statement of two central constructs in 
the social psychological explication of behavior has been made theoreti-
cally evident. A complete statement of definition has obtained in the 
case of both constructs, thereby correcting the previously explicated 
criticism of the Chicagoans, ergo, laying a foundation for the possibil-
ity of empirical verification. Concomitantly, it has been possible to 
retain the essential idea of the "internalized processual flow" at the 
base of any behavioral production, found in the initial Meadian perspec-
tive; this, the present writer deems, is essential to truly conceptual-
izing symbolic interaction in the explanation of human social life. 
To this point (that is, theoretically at least)i it is possible 
to envision the erasure of the polarized division of the symbolic in-
teractionist perspective in terms of a humanistic and a scientific 
viewpoint. A shift away from the Iowan determin.i,~stic position, as well 
as the Chicagoan indeterministic position is suggested. Ergo, recog-
nition of the processual nature of behavioral productions implies non-
determinancy (a positive value at the present theoretical stage), 
albeit, if the cognitive components (Me Previous; Me Present) in this 
interaction are identifiable, a step has been made from the complete 
unpredictability of and/or novelness of behavior. Concretely, this is 
to say that if the several previous selves characterizing an individual 
are knowable, as well as the particular perceived situation, and fur-
ther, the interactional nature of these two components is systematical-
ly inferred, then a narrower specification for behavior is enabled, 
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than if such knowledge were absent. For example, any one of the various 
Iowan selves (corresponding to the various groups from which one identi-
fies himself) when "called out" by a situation may be retarded in its 
effectiveness for eliciting compensatory behavior, because of con-
straints from the potency of "other selves," not constraints from a 
"dumping ground" of constraining factors. 
Research Questions 
In view of: (1) the centralness of both individualistic and 
sociologistic factors in any social psychological exposition of be-
havior; (2) a history of failures with regard to adequately conceptual-
izing (and consequently, methodologically operating on the conceptualiz-
ation) these factors in social psychological literature; (3) the infer-
ences made available by the critical examination of the social psycho-
logical theoretical orientation, symbolic interactionism, where explicit 
accommodation is made for the theoretical centralness of these individu-
alistic and sociologistic f actors--a number of questions may now be 
posited for empirical enlightment and/or verification. 
Generally, the research question is one of discerning whether there 
is or there is not a significant difference in the proportion of sub-
jects whose behavior is informed by: a Chicagoan definition of the 
self; a Iowan definition of the self; an Io-Chicagoan conception of the 
self. The term Io-Chicagoan is the term given to the symbolic interac-
tionist rationale developed in this chapter. 
Stated formally, the research question to be answered is: Is there 
or there is not a significant difference in the number of subjects whose 
behavior is and is not informed by a Chicagoan; an Iowan and an Io-
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Chicagoan definition of the self? 
Additionally, it is a contention that over variable situations, 
the number of persons whose behavior is in line with the Io-Chicagoan 
hypothesis will characterize a quantitatively greater number of people's 
behavior than either the Chicagoan or the Iowan hypotheses. Formally 
stated the question is: Over variable situations, will the number of 
persons whose behavior is in line with the Io-Chicagoan hypothesis 
characterize a quantitatively greater number of persons' behavior than 
either the Chicagoan or the Iowan hypotheses? 
CHAPTER IV 
METHODS OF RESEARCH 
Introduction 
This chapter will outline the specific methodological procedures 
used in the collection of the data so that the theoretically deduced re-
search questions can be answered in a systematic manner. These methodo-
logical procedures are discussed under three separate topics: (1) Data 
Source Procedures; (2) Research Design Procedures; and (3) Data Analysis 
J(rocedures. 
Under the section, Data Source Procedures, the task is a simple one 
of describing the type of sample obtained and the characteristics of this 
sample; additionally, the manner of actually selecting the critical sub-
jects is generally alluded to. The Research Design Procedures section 
outlines the methodology involved in the complete collection of the 
data. These several procedures are sequentially summarized in Figure 1. 
The figure shows that the entire task begins by identifying the methodo-
logy involved in narrowing and ascertaining: (1) the appropriate sample 
of subjects; (2) the operationalization of the "Me Previous" construct; 
and (3) information pertaining to the potential "normative content" to 
be used in the operationalization of the "Me Present" in the third and 
fourth stages. 
Initially, Twenty Statements Test instructions were distributed and 
from these, two consensual definitions were chosen; subsequently, the 
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Step One. 
TWENTY STATEMENTS TEST {TST) 
{Instrument for identifying the self description of a respondent) 
Step Two 
OPEN-ENDED ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE 
{Instrument for identifying the attitudinal basis of. 
consensual TST identifications) 
Step Three 
OBSERVATION {INTERACTIONAL SITUATION) ONE 
{Experimental manipuiation operationalizing the "Me Present", 
the "role definitional other", and the "Me") 
Step Four 
OBSERVATION {INTERACTIONAL SITUATION) TWO 
{Experimental manipulation operationalizing the "Me Present", 
the "role definitional other", and the "Me") 
Step Five 
POST OBSERVATI:ON INVENTORY {"WHY INQUIRY") 
{Instrument for identifying the relative empirical support, 
obtaining for the three theoretical perspectives 
under observation) 
Figure 1. Research Design Summary 
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same students (potential subjects) were asked to detail the meaning of 
these two definitions (the Open-ended Attitude questionnaire). From the 
information obtained at this stage, experimental operationalizations of 
the "Me Present" (the "role definitional other" and the "Me") could be 
manipulated by using the information obtained from the attitude question-
naire as the "normative content mediating the interaction" in an encount-
er group setting (steps three and four). This, of course, represents a 
perceptual-cognitive factor for the subject. Thus a subject is placed 
in the group situations and is asked to act in specified ways·. He may 
or may not carry out the act, but presumably he will engage in some form 
of symbolic interaction to a greater or lesser extent, before acting. 
The fifth step is designed to tap the actual nature and extent of this 
symbolic interaction and thereby identify the relative empirical sup-
port, obtaining for the. three theoretical interactionist perspectives, 
outlined and explained in earlier chapters. 
The re~ulting frequency data will be analyzed via several analytical 
procedures (discussed in the Research Analysis Procedures section of 
this chapter) : test of the significance of differ~nce between frequencies 
(chi square analysis); test of the significance of difference between 
proportions; and finally, test of stochastic processes. Conclusions 
concerning the practicality of the theoretical arguments can then be 
intelligibly discussed. 
Data Source Procedures 
It is customary (theoretically, at least) to insure the representa-
tiveness of the sample, so that legitimate generalizations are possible. 
Such a goal is well received, however, such systematization could (in-
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deed should) be reserved for the more entrenched rationales. Thus, con-
sidering the exploratory and suggestive nature of the several research 
questions, it is inthe best interest of the intentions of this paper, 
and as a corollary, of the more general theoretical development of 
these several questions, to delay acting upon this concern. 
Indeed, conceding positive support for the several research ques-
tions, other intermediate sampling stages would seem mandatory before 
arriving at a stage of seeking systematic inferences. Here, reference 
is to Glaser and Strauss' (1969) suggestion for theoretical sampling. 
Though not in agreement with the total thesis of these two authors, the 
present writer does identify with their cautious approach to "knowledge 
generation". 
Conceiving such, as the rationale behind the sampling motivations 
of the writer, it is possible with a clearer conscious to elucidate the 
sampling plan. The research design utilizes a non-probability sample 
of 100 subjects. Additionally, two confederates are demanded by the re-
search procedure. The subjects were introductory sociology students, 
selected on the basis of their Twenty Statements Test (TST) identifica-
tions and the corresponding research needs. It is sufficient to note, 
presently, that all students in five sections of Introductory Sociology 
were initially confronted with the TST instructions from which the pool 
of subjects was subsequently chosen. 
Research Design Procedures 
Collection of the data will entail a rather complex procedure. The 
totality of the experimental manipulations and data inference procedures 
should enable observations informing the feasibility of the equivalence 
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of knowing the self defining process and his or her behavior (see Figure 
1) • 
Initially, TST instructions (Appendix A) were distributed to sever-
al sections of classes in introductory sociology, during the fourth and 
fifth week of the Fall term (1974). Two weeks later and over a two 
week period, these same respondents were given a general attitude ques-
tionnaire. The students actually involved in the experimental phase of 
the study were volunteers from this established usable pool. Finally, 
over a 12 day (2 hours/day; 4-6 subjects/hour) period, these subjects 
received several experimental manipulations, from which the results 
served as the basic source of data for testing the research questions. 
For no one subject did the time involved, take more than 15 minutes. 
Confederates (one male and one female) used in these procedures were 
students from a social psychology class whose appeararice and mannerisms 
were little different from the introductory sociology student. Their 
role was central to the success of the experiment. Thus, in depth train-
ing was mandatory in the pre-experimental enactments and refinements of 
the actual experimental procedures. 
These general remarks may now be specifically identified. To test 
the research questions, a distinct encounter group for each subject was 
necessitated, where any one of these groups consisted of two confederates 
and a naive subject (S,, where i is the particular subject: 1, 2, ••• 
1 
100), representing the social structure(s) by which the subject (i) had 
earlier identified him or herself. That is, the confederates were told 
to act in certain specified manners, corresponding to the content and 
inferences drawn from the attitude questionnaire used at the time of the 
second contact with the subject. For example, a subject, perhaps init-
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ially most strongly identifies herself (via the TST instructions) as: 
"I am a woman"; subsequently after content analyzing (via theme analysis, 
i.e., the predominate subject-predicate combination) her response to the 
second attitude questionnaire, which open endedly probed the content of 
this identification, an inference was made, say, as to the liberationist 
orientation of the subject. The latter was the case for the present re-
search. From this inference, the sociocultural structure of the group 
is determined; that is, the confederates structure their behavior so as 
to reflect the opposite orientation to that of the critical subject. 
. ' . . 
More specifically, as the subject enters the waitin~ room, one of the 
confederates (the female) is attempting to persuade the second confeder-
ate to sign a letter which is, ultimately, to be Sent to the school 
newspaper. The content of the letter is in support of some policy on 
women's liberation (signing or not signing a letter in support of a 
women's liberationist ideology, supporting agitation for a student wom-
en's boycott of classes). The second confederate acts in a neutral man-
ner, but demonstrated a predisposition toward or away from signing, de-
pending upon the inferences drawn about the liberationist orientation 
of the subject. For example, if a pre-liberationist estimation of the 
subject availed, then the second confederate leaned away from signing. 
In this atmosphere of uncertainty on the part of the second confederate, 
the first confederate invites the critical subject into the conversation, 
seeking his or her support for the same letter. 
It should be made evident that the TST identification initially 
chosen to represent the "most favorable identification" was one of the 
statements in the upper one half of the consensual statements. Kuhn and 
McPartland (1954) note that usually half of the twenty statements are 
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consensual (i.e., the first ten). The particular statement, chosen 
among the top one half was selected according to whether other subjects 
had the particular statement listed at any position among the top one 
half of their statements. This was necessitated so as to make the actual 
data gathering procedures as economical and comparable as pos.sible. Of 
course, it was felt that the selected statement met the characterizing 
criterion of consensual statements. 
Once a TST statement, along with one other had been chosen, the 
second of the above referenced questionnaires was constructed. 1 This 
schedule consisted of two open ended questions (see Appendix B) and was 
given to the appropriately selected TST respondents. These two ques-
tions, reflecting the two consensual Iowan self identifications merely 
ask the respondent to speak at length on what it personally means to be 
a student and what it personally means to be a male"or female. For any 
one subject, each of his responses were separately content analyzed, the 
ultimate goal being the selection of the dominant attitudinal theme 
within each particular Iowan self definition. From this point on, lab-
oratory procedures ensued. 
That is, the investigator, upon reaching such and such an attitude 
inference from the responses to the latter questionnaire, informed the 
confederates of their role playing duties (brief interactional scripts) 
in the experimentally. created encounter groups. These scripts were de-
.1 
The next most popular consensual identification, besides "I am a 
male (female)" was: "I am a student". It is necessary in the analysis 
of the data to have attitudinal information on this additional identi-
fication (i.e., on at least one other consensual statement, that is, in 
addition to the statement chosen for the principle concern). This 
second attitudinal theme is not of immediate relevance, and will be 
further and most profitably developed at a later point. 
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signed so as to objectively portray a situation for perception by the 
naive subject. The situation staged, as noted earlier, was opposite, in 
terms of the "normative content" guiding interaction, the inference 
drawn from the second questionnaire. The content of this situation, 
once perceived, is the "Me Present." 
A naive subject, thus enters the contrived group, unsuspectingly; 
the subject is under the impression that he or she and the two confeder-
ates are all subjects sitting in a waiting room in anticipation of an 
experiment. 
The familiarity of waiting room conversations is quite familiar to 
everyone and no less should be expected for the present, especially if 
matters are helped by the subject's role set (the two confederates). 
This waiting room group becomes an interactional situation which when 
phenomenologically perceived by the subject constitutes what has been 
earlier referred to as the "Me Present"; recall that the data for the 
"Me Previous", the second of the revised Chicagoan constructs, has al-
ready been collected. This perception is not assumed to be a given 
(i.e., recognizable and interpreted similarly by everyone). The incor-
poration of this assumption is in line with orthodox interactionist 
literature. For example, Thomas and Kuhn (1950) note that the defini-
tion of the situation is dependent not only upon objective reality, but 
also subjective appreciation and often there is a "wide discrepancy be-
tween the situation as it seems to others and the situation as it seems 
to the individual. •• " Therefore, at a later stage, via a post experi-
mental interview, information on just what the subjects' did perceive 
was obtained; only in those cases where there was a congruence between 
what the subject perceived and what was experimentally intended, will 
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the subject's data be used in the analytical procedures. Initially, 
however, only a behavioroid measure was obtained by the confederates, 
depending on whether the subject cqnformed or failed to conform to the 
confederate's enticements (signing or not signing the letter). 
After this initial .observation (situation One), the investigator 
enters, informing one of the confederates that he is now ready for him 
or her. They (the investigator and the first confederate, the female) 
depart, leaving the second confederate and the subject in the waiting 
room. At this point, the second confederate, who in the previous situa-
tion played a confused and undecided role in reacting to the enticements 
of the first confederate, uses the previous experience (signing or not 
signing a letter) for his own purposes. Trying to show a continuity be-
tween their previously shared experience, the confederate purposes that 
he and the critical subject write their own letter to the school paper, 
expressing their vehemency toward being obligated (class requirement; 
conditional for extra credit, etc.) to participate in experiments as 
part of their education as students. The confederate observed whether 
the subject agreed to release his or her address, so they could be con-
tacted at a later time in order to work on the suggested project. This 
second observation (situation Two) was an attempt to situationally rep-
resent the interpretations of the deductions made from the content 
analysis of the subject's response to the second questionnaire (Appendix 
B). All of the responses were categorized so as to reflect a theme of 
the instrumental value of being a student. Typical of the responses is 
the following: "Being a student means a better opportunity for acquiring 
more education and later obtaining a job better than I would be able to 
get without a degree." It should be observed that the second confederate 
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did not intentionally take an.orientation opposite that of the subject 
in this situation. The reason for this was the "uninvolving nature" of 
this particular argument. That is, it was felt that the subject would 
.fail to be affected (involved) in the called for behavior, if the task 
was perceived as one of merely agreeing to co-sign aletter in support of 
the idea that their role as student was congruent with their obligations 
for experimental participation. 
Additional interactional encounters (both those relevant to varia-
ble self identifications and to role situations lacking a relevant self 
definition) would be relevant for comparative purposes at this point. 
However, such is beyond the present endeavor. Such, of course, is the 
next most logical research step, contingent upon the correspondence of 
the present hypothesis with reality. And, as will be shown later, 
whether the present hypotheses are supported or not, a significant ad-
vance will have been taken in the empirical observability of the central 
concepts of the symbolic interactionist perspective. A third, or more 
situations might be created, calling for a certain behavior(s) on the 
part of the subject. The second interaction situation (just described) 
was relevant only in the latter phases of the analysis of the data. 
The next experimentally relevant manipulation was seen essentially 
as a post experimental interview with the subject. After the second 
observation situation, the investigator returned to the waiting room, 
dismissing the remaining confederate. He then explained the actual ex-
perimental hypothesis; apologies were given and the subject was asked if 
he had any suggestions for improving the experiment. With these proce-
dures, it was assumed that the subject would have some commitment to the 
experiment; thus he was asked not to disclose his experiences, as there 
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were possibly other subjects in his sociology cla.ss who had yet to re-
ceive the experimental manipulations. 
i 
As a measure for the insurance 
of subsequent subject loyalty, a behavioroid comm.Ltment was sought from 
the subject, i.e., stating his future availability as a confederate for 
the experiment. All of the previous represents an attempt to gain the 
confidence of the subject. 
This accomplished, the experimenter asked the subject to briefly 
tell why he behaved as he did; what cognitive thoughts informed his be-
havior in any one situation. This is referred to in Figure 1 as the 
"Why Inquiry". The subjects were asked explicitly: (1) their thoughts 
positively supporting the "called for" behavior; (2) their thoughts 
which negatively evaluated the "called for" behavior. The answers to 
these questions were obtained by providing a structured inventory check 
list to each subject, tailored to each uniquely. Tha·t is, subjects, in 
answering the above questions, completed an inventory (Appendix C) which 
listed their unique consensual statements. The statements, of course, 
were obtained from the initially collected TST identifications, by pre-
scribed procedures, outlined earlier (Tucker, 1966: 353). All of the 
consensual definitions, including the situationally operative defini-
tion--representing the "Me Present", were merely listed for both inter-
actional situations. Each list was concluded with an "Other" category, 
referencing the fact that not any of the consensual statements were 
associated with the cognitions informing their behavior in the inter-
actional situation(s). 
Responses were interpreted in terms of whether they could be scored 
as support for the Chicagoan, Iowan, or Io-Chicagoan perspective. Thus, 
a subject who in any way checked the "Other" category (included at the 
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end of the series of consensual items--the "Me Previous"), 011 the in-
ventory, supported the Chicagoan hypothesis. Subjects checking only the 
sex identificatibn category for situation One and the student category 
for situation Two supported the Iowan interpretation. Checks in one or 
several of the categories, not including or including respectively, a 
check in the sex identification (student identification) category, con-
stituted support for the Io-Chicagoan hypothesis. 
The above procedures were carried out for both the aforementioned 
TST identifications, over the test population, the result being a fre-
quency count of relative support for the three pefspectives. Table II 
summarizes much of the arguments to this point; it' is the cells of this 
table that will recieve the differential accumulation of empirical sup-
port. The association between this scoring procedure and the elucidated 
theoretical rationales is quite evident. It is only with the results of 
the "Why Inquiry" that it becomes possible to precisely answer the ques-
tion of just 'W'hich theoretical perspective the data supports in each ex-
perimental situation; ergo, and in order to recapitulate, if the analysis 
shows one or more responses to the "Why Inquiry" which correspond to one 
(excluding the situational perceptual cognitive factor, the "Me Present") 
or several (excluding or including the situational perceptual-cognitive 
factor) of the underlying social selves, then the inference will be of 
an interaction between a "Me Previous" and a "Me Present". Quite 
naturally, this implies the additional assumption that the subject is 
able to accurately concatenate and recall the cognitive elements that 
informed his behavior. If substantial support obtains in this category 
(via replication of these procedures), then "behavior informed by a 
self" would be more credibly discussed from the perspective outlined in 
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TABLE II 
EXPERIMENTAL INTERACTION SITUATIONS PER SUBJECT 
Interaction Situation One Interaction Situation Two 











IJ' s:: IJ' s:: 
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0 ..c: 0 0 0 0 H CJ H H H 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
RI = Relevant 
II = Irrelevant 
NI = No 
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the theoretical development of this paper. A major gain would be the 
demonstration of the hypothesis of the less than total unpredictability 
of behavior. Mead's "I" was unpredictable (creativity; innovativeness), 
leading to an unpredictable explication of behavior as it is informed by 
a self. Indeed, the unpredictable estimation of behavior for the Ib-
Chicagoan perspective still remains. This is because the identification 
of the actual "internalized other(s)", of the several available, which 
are used in defining a situation and the outcome of these implicated 
"internalized other(s) in their interaction with the "Me Present" is 
still indeterminate. However, the total unpredictability of the origin-
ality in behavior is narrowed. As such, the remain:tng "originality" re-
mains as a residue, awaiting further clarification. An additional re-
search assumption is made that the subject will perceive a situation in 
terms of its objective implications (in case the subject does not, how-
ever, recall that this is controlled for). 
If the analysis of the check list in any way showed that the sub-
ject had checked the "Other" category, thus implying that his cognitions 
replicated none of his underlying self identifications, but rather, 
represented novel and innovative cognitions, then the interpretation 
would be a Chicagoan operative self, involving the interaction of an "I" 
and "Me". 
Subjects failing to check any category other than that which was 
reflected by the situationally relevant perceptual-cognitive factor were 
seen as supporting the Iowan self conception, the latter involving no 
interiorized interaction. 
Finally, the subject was queried as to his perceptions in the in-
teractional situation (i.e., the "Me Present" content). The reader 
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should recall the earlier discussion of the importance of this procedure 
as a control measure. Only in those cases where there was a congruence 
between the assumptionpredicatingthe rationale and the subject's actual 
perceptions was the subject's data retained in the analytical procedures. 
Such are the procedures and the rationale for generating the data. 
It is understandable that replication of these procedures over a series 
of subjects should generate frequency distributions, thus setting the 
stage for a precise analysis of the data. 
Data Analysis Procedures 
The reader should, by now, already be aware of the several defini-
tions informing the various relevant concepts. For reasons of formality, 
the following definitions are explicitly noted: 
The "Me Previous" is the collection of consensual statements ob-
tained from the self directed question, "Who Am I?", the TST. 
The "Me Present" is the normative content mediating the interaction 
of any one experimentally contrived group (i.e., Relevant Structure). 
The source of the normative content refers to one of the consensual re-
sponses among the initial half of the TST responses of the subject. 
The "I" references responses to a post experimental interview 
question ("why inquiry") which fails to replicate any of the TST con-
sensual categories, i.e., which fails to have an empirical correspond-
ence among the TST consensual identifications. The "Me" is defined 
similarly to the "Me Previous." 
"Conforming behavior" and "Nonconforming behavior", respectively, 
are behavior commitments with respect to some particular behavioroid 
measure either in agreement with or not in agreement with it. 
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"Chicagoan informed behavior" corresponds nominally to the symbolic 
interactionist arguments of Mead and Blumer; operationally, it is rep-
resented by a person (represented in terms of a frequency mark) whose 
behavior has been inf erred to be a function of the interaction of an 
"I" and "Me." 
"Iowan informed behavior" corresponds nominally to the symbolic in-
teractionist arguments of Kuhn and his followers; operationally, it is 
represented by a person (represented in terms of a frequency mark) whose 
behavior has been inferred to be a function of his "conforming behavior" 
with no interaction of neither an "I" and "Me," nor a "Me Previous" and 
"Me Present." 
"Io- hicagoan informed behavior" corresponds to the symbolic inter-
actionist theoretical argument introduced in the present study; opera-
tionally, it is represented by a person (represented in terms of a fre-
quency mark) whose behavior has been inferred to be a function of the 
interaction of a "Me Previous" and a "Me Present." 
With these definitions made explicit, it is possible to continue 
with the objective in this section. Data from the first experimental 
manipulation (interactional situation One) and the corollary interview 
question accompanying it are relevant to the first three cells of Table 
II, interaction situation One, while the data obtained for the second 
interactional situation (observation Two) are relevant to the latter 
three cells of the table. In this same table, relevant interaction (RI) 
has reference to the meaningfully purposive interaction of the two 
mental constructs: "Me Previous" and "Me Present." Irrelevant inter-
action (II) references interaction between an unknowable (at least un-
til after some action and even then one is forced to properly speak of 
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a "Me") "I" component and a "Me" component. Nonrelevant interaction 
(NI), naturally refers to the· fact that there is no "inner forum" inter-
action between such mental constructs. The terms relevant and irrele-
vant and nonrelevant interaction seek to summarize the theoretical 
elucidation of the three symbolic interactionist perspectives, explicat-
ed earlier. 
With the cells .of Table II differentially filled with frequencies, 
the first and most intuitive analytical task is that of establishing 
the significance or nonsignificance of difference between the cell fre-
quencies and proportions. The usefulness of this approach is to show in 
as a conclusive way as possible, either the support or nonsupport for 
the arguments of this paper. The frequencies will enable not only the 
' possibility of statistically manipulating them, but or working with 
proportions. The first operation is one of looking at the significance 
of differences between the three theoretical rationales for each situa-
tion. A chi square goodness of fit test was used to establish these 
estimates. In further testing of the primary research question, it was 
necessary to observe the total frequency count for cell 1, as contrasted 
with those of cells 2 and 3, respectively; and also, the frequencies of 
cell 2 was compared with those of cell 3. The same relations were also 
observed for the second observation (cells 4, 5, 6). These frequencies 
were converted to proportions (dividing each total by the total possible 
frequencies), after which use was made of the Lawske-Baker Nomograph 
(Downie and Heath, 1965: 150-151) to observe the particular empirical 
omega values; these observed omega values can be compared with theoreti-
cally occurring critical omega values in order to determine whether each 
or any of the specified difference relations were significant at a speci-
fied level of confidence. From this, inferences as to whether these 
particular subjects behave more in terms of the: Iowan, Chicagoan, or 
Io-Chicagoan rationales is possible. 
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Finally, because a certain nondefiniteness was perceived in the 
above analytical procedures, it was decided that more strigent conclu-
sions could be drawn if it were possible to accommodate some procedure 
which would generate a series of effect parameters for the several 
postulated conditions. Ideally, the application of some multivariate 
stochastic process would be desired at this point, but perceiving its 
nonapplicability, it is instead useful to consider the present data in 
the light of a more simplistic stochastic process, intimately related to 
the more informative stochastic processes. Coleman's (1964: 135-139) 
outline of the use 0£ this analytical procedure may be referred to as a 
Differential Rate procedure. Here, under the assumption of the exist-
ence of a state of aggregate equilibrium (limits on shifts between 
theoretically related states (categories)), it is possible to precisely 
and quantitatively speak of empirical behavioral implications represent-
ed by the three elucidated symbolic interactionist perspectives in this 
paper. The ultimate intention is one of establishing the specific 
equilibrium points of the number of subjects whose behavior is Iowan 
self informed (or Chicagoan or Io-Chicagoan) at any one time and again 
at a subsequent time relative to the equilibrium points of the number 
of subjects whose behavior is informed by each of the alternative self 
definitions. 
Perhaps the suggested rationale may be most parsimoniously under-
stood by a further consideration of the several necessary parameters 
needed in order to establish the equilibrium points. The several tran-
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sition rates suggest the necessity of several calculations, appropriate 
for two by two contingency tables. From the data collection procedures 
of this research, tables, as formated and represented in Tables V, VI, 
VII (Chapter V), would have to be filled in order to calculate the tran-
sition rates and subsequently, the equilibrium points. 
The relative frequencies appropriate for each of the cells of the 
several tables show the subjects, as they are differentially dichoto-
mized for specific analytical purposes at each of two time periods, ac-
cording to the theoretical perspective supported by the tabulation of 
their "Why Inquiry" inventory responses. Such a tabular presentation 
allows portrayal of whether the same subjects, whose responses supported 
one theoretical perspective at time One, supports the same theoretical 
I 
perspective at time Two. For example, with Table V, it is possible to 
observe the number of people whose responses supported the Chicagoan 
and/or the Io-Chicagoan perspectives (state j), at time One, relative to 
the number whose responses have shifted to supporting the Iowan inter-
preation (state 1), at time Two. This procedure thus indicates imper-
tant shifts in both the hypothesized directions, during the intervening 
period, but the extent to which these shifts tend to counteract one 
another is the important question for the present research questions. 
Here, reference is particularly to the relative equilibrium points. 
The equilibrium points are denoted by N. and N. , where i and j 
1.00 JOO 
represent the state(s) and 00 is t (the number of observation time in-
tervals) at infinity. The interval for the present calculation is one. 
This is because data from two interactional situations have been col-
lected, thus there is one interval between them. It was for this rea-
son that two interactional encounter situations were necessary in the 
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collection of the data. The established points can be seen as a function 
of several transition rates (q .. or q .. , where i re~erence·s a specific 
. 1] ]1 
' 
theoretical state: 1, 2, 3 and j references a specifi.c (or specific set) 
alternative theoretical state(s): 1,2,3, at some subsequent time. Thus 
the following rates may be designated: qlj (the rate of the number of 
subjects in state one who shift to state two (Chicagoan) or state three 
(Io-Chicagoan) at any subsequent time, where state one refers to be-
havior as a function of the Iowan self conception); q 2j (those shifting 
from state two to state one or state three); q . (those shifting from 
3] 
state three to state one or state two). 
fleet the opposite transition process. 
The rates: q .. ; q. 2 ; q. 3 re-J1 J J 
The equilibrium points (N. or 
1"" 
N. , where i (or j) represents the state (or states) and oo is t (number 
J"" 
of observation time intervals at infinity) are as defined. In the cal-
culations, when Nit (the number in some state at time) is substituted 
by N100 (or N200 or N300 ) and the appropriate equations are solved, the 
aggregate equilibrium points can be established. These points will 
allow a definitive conclusion for the second research question. 
By looking at these points (that is, after having solved for each 
of them) in a comparative fashion, it is possible in a definitive manner 
to observe whether over time, the behavior of the subjects of this re-
search is informed more characteristically by a self defined in terms of 
the Chicagoan, Iowan, or Io-Chicagoan symbolic interactionist theoreti-
cal perspectives. 
The reader should recall that the ultimate concern, here, is a more 
precise quantitative statement (i.e., information in addition to the 
statement: "there is a significant difference"). Either the latter 
and/or some other elaboration technique usually obtains. As Coleman 
(1964: 190) states: 
••. the usual procedure for multivariate analysis of attribute 
data remains as always: we lay out in tabular form the data in 
its .full grandeur, then examine the percentages in the depend-
ent attribute among the various classifications. 
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Such a multiangulated approach to data analysis, as the above, is 
especially relevant in the initial stages of any theoretical exploration 
(indeed, an argument can be made for such an approach at any theoretical 
stage). This statement will become increasingly meilningful with the 
progression of this research report. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS OF THE METHODOLOGICAL PROCEDURES 
Research Question One 
Data to answer the primary research question is presented in Tables 
III and IV. 2 Significant X goodness of fit values of 16.11 and 23.68 
for observations One and Two, respectively, obtain, summarizing the dif-
ferential empirical support for the three tested thQoretical perspec-
tives. This is to say that there are significant differences, for both 
testing situations, in the empirical support obtaining for the Chicagoan, 
Iowan, and Io-Chicagoan theoretical perspectives. The next step in the 
clarification of these two overall measures involves the individual 
study of the several relationships possible between the three perspec-
tives at each observation point. At this stage of analysis, it will 
become possible to note a few additional comments in relation to the 
overall trend. Use of the Lawshe-Baker Nomograph (Downie and Heath, 
1965: 150) enables such an examination in terms of the relevant differ-
ential proportions. For observation (situation) One, critical omega 
values (.05 significance level) of .42, .30, and .41 are found, cor-
responding respectively to the obtained omega values of .62 (describing 
the proportion difference between the Chicagoan and Iowan empirical 
support), .18 (describing the proportion difference between the Chica-
goan and Io-Chicagoan empirical support), and .77 (describing the pro-
portion difference between the Io-Chicagoan and Iowan empirical support. 
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TABLE III 
FREQUENCY OF DIFFERENTIAL EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR THREE (3) 
MAJOR INTERACTIONIST THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
FOR OBSERVATION (SITUATION) ONE 
Theoretical Support 
Obtained Expected 
Theoretical Perspective Frequency % Frequency 
Iowan 15 15 33.33 
Chicagoan 37 37 33.33 
Io-Chicagoan 48 48 33.33 
Totals 100 100 99.99 
2 








FREQUENCY OF DIFFERENTIAL EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR THREE (3) 
MAJOR INTERACTIONIST THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
FOR OBSERVATION (SITUATION) TWO 
Theoretical Support 
Obtained Expected 
Theoretical Perspective Frequency % Frequency 
Iowan 56 56 33.33 
Chicagoan 19 19 33.33 
Io-Chicagoan 25 25 33.33 
Totals 100 100 99.99 
2 








observation (situation) Two results in critical omega (P < .05) and ob-
served omega values, respectively, of: .37 and .76 (Chicagoan and 
Iowan); .42 and .21 (Chicagoan and Io-Chicagoan); .33 and .56 (Io-
Chicagoan and Iowan). Conclusions concerning these observations avail 
deductions of significant differences in the proportions between the 
Chicagoan and Iowan support for both observation time periods; non-sig-
nificant proportion differences between the Chicagoan and Io-Chicagoan 
support for both observation time periods; and finally, significant 
proportion differences between the Io-Chicagoan and Iowan support for 
both time periods. These conclusions, taken at face value, represent a 
degree of confidence in the stability of the differences, at least over 
these two time periods and for the associated situations. 
However, upon closer analysis, an inconsistency forces itself to 
attention. The results at this stage of analysis show that there is a 
significantly greater proportion of support for the Chicagoan perspec-
tive when compared with the Iowan perspective for situation One. Analysis 
of situation Two, however, shows the opposite conclusion; there is sig-
nificantly .more support for the Iowan perspective than the Chicagoan 
perspective. The lack of the accumulation of significant support for 
either perspective is evident in the case of the comparison of the 
Chicagoan and Io-Chicagoan categories, for both situations. Additional-
ly, situation One shows the significantly greater support for the Io-
Chicagoan perspective, when contrasted with the support received by the 
Iowan perspective, however, a direct reversal in these conclusions is 
necessitated for situation Two; that is, there was significantly more 
support for the Iowan perspective as contrasted with the Io-Chicagoan 
perspective. 
The additional findings at this stage of the analysis certainly do 
constitute a matter for further concern. 
Research Question Two 
For this reason and in an attempt to accommodate a more precise set 
of analytical procedures, the data was analyzed at a third stage, in an-
ticipation that some further insights might avail. Tables V, VI, and 
VII summarize the pertinent information: equilibrium points and transi-
tion rates. 
Both Tables VI and VII show, respectively, the much higher rates of 
transition (1.499 and 1.459) for subject migration from their initial 
position in state 2 (Chicagoan) and state 3 (Io-Chicagoan) to states: 
1 or 3 (that is, to the states associated with the· Iowan or Io-Chicagoan 
perspectives) and 1 or 2 (Iowan or Chicagoan). These respective tran-
sition rates should be seen relative to those moving from states 1 or 3 
(Iowan or Io-Chicagoan; Table VI) to state 2 (qj 2 = .277); and, for 
Table VII, those moving from states 1 or 2 (Iowan or Chicagoan) to state 
3 (q. 3 = .323). Each of the rates in Tables VI and VII can, in turn, be J ' 
compared to the associated rates of movement in Table V. Table V sum-
marizes the rate of moving from state 1 (Iowan) to states 2 or 3 
(qlj = .737) and from states 2 or 3 (Chicagoan or Io-Chicagoan) to state 
1 (qjl = 1.319). In less technical terms, the six rates precisely attest 
to the fact that behavior which is interpretable in terms of the Iowan 
or Chicagoan or Io-Chicagoan self definition on the first observation 
is more likely to be interpretable by the Iowan definition, rather than 
either the Chicagoan or Io-Chicagoan definition, on the second observa-
tion (situation). 
TABLE V 
OVER TIME FREQUENCIES OF SUBJECTS MOVING FROM STATE 1 TO STATE j 
(STATES 2 OR 3) AND FROM STATE j 'i'O STATE 1 
Observation One 
Observation Two State 1 State 
State 1 11 47 
State j 5 37 
qlj = .737 
qjl L319 




OVER TIME FREQUENCIES OF SUBJECTS MOVING FROM STATE 2 TO STATE j 




Observation Two State 2 State j 
State 2 11 8 
State j 26 55 
q2j = 1.499 





OVER TIME FREQUENCIES OF SUBJECTS MOVING FROM STATE 3 TO STATE j 
(STATES 1 OR 2) AND FROM STATE j TO STATE 3 
Observation One 
68 
Observation Two State 3 State j 
State 3 15 8 
State j 32 45 
q3j 1.459 
qj3 = .323 
N3oo = 18 
N. = 82 JOO 
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In generalizing the relative theoretical supiort, over time, be-
yond the two present observations, the functionality of the equilibrium 
points becomes evident. Thus N100 (Table V) contains 64 people out of 
100 while N. (the aggregate equilibrium number of subjects, at anytime, JOO 
whose behavior is informed by one of the self process rationales other 
than the Iowan rationale, i.e., the Iowan rationale is synonymous with 
state 1) contains 36 out of the 100. From Tables VI and VII, the num-
bers, respectively, for: N2 , N . , N3 , N . are : 00 JOO 00 JOO 15, 85; 18, and 82. 
The immediate task thus becomes one of establishing the relative propor-
tion differences (significant or nonsignificant) between the empirical 
support obtaining for the three theoretical perspectives. The first 
question is whether N100 (64) is similar to N200 (15); that is, is there a 
significant difference in the subjects moving from state 1 to states 2 
or 3 and these moving from state 2 to states 1 or 3. In order to make 
an empirical comment on this question, it is necessary to look at the 
relative change in frequencies of support for the various theoretical 
perspectives, over time. For the first question, attention should be 
directed to Tables v and VI. Directing attention first, to Table V, this 
rationale suggest the relevancy of the number of subjects initially in 
state 1 at observation One who migrated to states 2 or 3 by observation 
two. It is found that of the 16 subjects in state 1 initially, 5 of them 
actually did make the above migration, that is .31 of the initial 16 
migrated. Using the same logic in Table VI (however, for state 2 rela-
tive to states 1 or 3), the proportion is .70. The z value (z = -2.84; 
P < .05) shows that the two proportions, are significantly different. 
A second question is whether N1 (64) relative to N. (36) is sig-oo JOO 
nificantly different from N300 (l8) relative to Nj 00 (82). Using the same 
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rationale as was used in answering the above question, a significant z 
value of -2.76 (P < .OS) obtains, describing the relation of the respec-
tive proportions. Th~ final z value (.20), describes the over time 
nonsignificant difference between N200 (15, in relation to N. (85)) and J"' ' 
N300 (18, in relation to Nj 00 (82)). 
This latter difference, of course, reflects the fact that with the 
present data, neither the Chicagoan nor the Io-Chicagoan interpretation 
is superior relative to the other in the amount of support that obtains 
for either, crossectionally or overtime. With respect to the second 
question of this section (the significance of difference between the 
equilibrium points, N100 and N300 , relative respectively, to "Nj 00 = 36" 
and "N = 18"), there is strong support for the :i:owan interpretation. 
j 00 
Finally, referring back to the first question in t:his section (the sig-
nificance of difference in the number of subjects, moving from state 1 
to states 2 or 3 and those moving from state 2 to states 1 or 3), the 
results also give support to the belief that over time (t = 00 ), it is 
possible to expect behavior to be more in line with the Iowan inter-
pretation, rather than the Chicagoan or Io-Chicagoan interpretation~ 
and further the aggregate equilibrium points establish the exact points 
of expectation. Overall, therefore, and in answer to the second re-
search question of the chq.pter, the viability of the Iowan interpreta-
tion for the present data is quite precisely evident. That is, over 
time (over variable situations) it is possible to expect behavior to be 
significantly more in line with the Iowan rationale rather than the Io-
Chicagoan rationale, as was suggested in the statement of the research 
question in Chapter III, or the Chicagoan rationale. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY, IMPORTANCE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
Symbolic interaction, as a social psychological theoretical orien-
tation, denotes the explanation of behavior as a function of the influ-
ence that one person has on another as a result of the individual first 
mentally interacting with a set of shared other definitions, leading to 
a definition of the situation, upon which behavior follows. This social 
psychological explanation of behavior is different from a sociological 
explanation via structural functionalism (behavior phenomena are func-
tional for a larger group) as well as other social psychological explan-
ations. Shaw and Costanzo (1970) refer to these social psychological 
explanations as theoretical orientations. These include the reinforce-
ment (behavior is seen as a function of reinforcement patterns); the 
cognitive (behavior is seen as a function of the tensions/nontensions 
resulting from unbalanced/balanced cognitions); the psychoanalytic (be-
havior is seen as a function of the result of solutions to conflicting 
unconscious and conscious psychological forces); and the field theoreti-
cal (behavior is seen as a function of the total field of psychological 
forces: individual and environmental) orientations. 
With the location of interactionist arguments established in rela-
tion to various alternative theoretical arguments, the purpose of this 
chapter may be seen as one of "closing and then reopening ranks". That 
is, the present chapter has as. its goal the provision not only of a 
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succinct review of the arguments and findings of the preceding chapters, 
but a larger goal, that of deducing a number of theoretical and research 
implications from the comments made in the preceding chapters. 
The study began by examining the 1nstitutionalized assumption of 
the nonresearchability of symbolic interactionist explanationsi anti-
thetical to this, observation was made of the landmarR theoretical con-
tribution of interactionist arguments in the works of Cooley and Mead. 
This contribution was seen as constituting the basis of a viable social 
psychological theoretical perspective. In fact, Hollander (1968), in a 
contemporary introductory social psychology text, speaks of the contri-
bution of interactionist thoughts in the early development of social 
psychology. From just this cursory and yet undeveloped discussion, the 
merit of inferring a dilemma in the tradition (the interactionist tra-
dition) was seen as a viable one. The development of this dilemma was 
presented in terms of the Chicagoan and Iowan interactionist perspec-
tives. Chicagoan symbolic interaction was seen as a reaction to behav-
iorist assumptions, therefore, Mead contended that behaviorist consider-
ed only the external aspects of total behavior. Mead's "social behav-
iorism" argues for nonsignificant as well as significant gestures in 
behavioral explanation. Recognition of an inner-incorporated mental 
process, involving an interaction of an "I" and "Me", was especially 
stressed. The mediating role of language, in this process, was also 
discussed. It was noted that implied in the foregoing was a certain 
complexity, only adequately described by further examination of the 
concepts: "I" and "Me". It was through the latter concept that it was 
possible to infer the potential influence of social definitions upon 
individual behavior. The corresponding adjusted response (many times 
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novel and innovative) of the interactant to the perceived other's defin-
ition was seen as the "I". It is via the interaction of these two 
mental components that one may most parsimoniously and correctly observe 
the referents in contemporary definitions of social psychology. In any 
theory of behavior, it was noted that it was of utmost importance to 
preserve the basic essence of this proposition, an "inner incorporated 
process". Presently, Blumer was seen as one who explicitly retains the 
idea. 
Though noting the theoretical importance of the Chicagoan proposi-
tion, it is scientifically essential.that convincing empirical substanti-
ations of it be made evident. The latter has not been an easy task for 
the Chicagoans; the reasons for thiswerefound to r~st mainly in the 
inadequate and/or inconsistent definitions of the major concepts. Along 
these lines, discussion was made of Mead's qualifactory use of the "I" 
concept. For example, Kolb (1944) was noted as referring to the "I" as 
a vaguely defined residual category. Indeed, it is the feeling of the 
present writer that if primary praise can be accorded to Mead for 
originating the proposition, then a primary indictment can be accorded 
him for his unclear definitions of the major concepts of the perspective. 
Iowan interactionist, represented mainly by Manford Kuhn (1956, 
1964), have perceived this definitional ambiguity and led by an emphasis 
on empirical verification, have dictated a theoretical position, di-
vorced of the "interpretative essence". For example, Kuhn has defined 
the "self as the responses subjects make to the self-directed question: 
"Who Am I?" This was seen as certainly a step in a definitionally pre-
cise direction; however, the complete Iowan argument was seen as logi-
cally unacceptable, despite its theoretically explicit accommodation of 
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an argument of an internal rehearsing p:rocess, because of the implicit 
corollary deductions which follow the complete Iowan Jrgumentt (i.e., 
that the acting person mentally and internally searches for that self 
definition that corresponds to the perceived role other definition). If 
the latter is the case, theri the acting person would need to mentally 
search (rehearse) his self definitions no further than the innnediate 
perceived role other definition. The immediate inference of this logic 
was that behavior is role defined. Even granting that the person does 
rehearse his several constituting self definitions in the Iowan manner, 
the resulting interpretative process was seen as still not comparable to 
the Chicagoan implication of a mental interaction not only between the 
"Me" (role definitional other) and the "I" (consensual self definition), 
but also between the "I" components themselves (what\ever they may be). 
In terms of the above arguments, the postulated dilemma within the 
interactionist tradition was seen as becoming quite real. This dilemma, 
stated in formal terms, was posed as a question: Is the goal one of em-
pirically relevant but incomplete theory, or of nonempirically relevant 
but complete theory. A rationale that preserved the Chicagoan interpre-
tative and processual essence was seen as needed, which at the same time 
would be defined precisely enough to allow its empirical elucidation. 
A conceptualization (the Io-Chicagoan) was introduced that was seen 
as retaining this essence and indeed retaining the contentual nature of 
the Chicagoan "Me". It was with respect to the structural (where 
structural refers to a position in a system, i.e., a mental system, 
consisting of mental positions, say "individualistic cognitions" and 
"others cognitions") and functional relationships between the "I" and 
"Me" that a reformulation was seen necessary. This was accomplished by 
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positing a processual relation between a "Me Previous" (collection of 
consensual Twenty Statements Testresponses--TST identifications, having 
an attitudinal base) and a "Me Present" (a perceptual-cognitive factor 
of the immediate normative content, mediating interaction. 
In the theoretical elucidation of the scheme, several mentally in-
corporated selves (socially accumulated) were seen as pre-existing, 
structurally taking the place of the Chicagoan "I". This, of course, 
was noted as quite similar to the Iowan rationale. Thus mental position 
one (arbitrarily defined; the underlying self component), previously 
occupied by "I" content was seen as now having the content of the 
Chicagoan "Me". This, of course, was based on the assumption that the 
content of the "Me" consisted of several self-role other input defini-
tions and not just one; if the latter obtained, the "Me" "WOuld be compar-
able ·to the Iowan "role definitional other" and the Io-chicagoan "Me 
Present". This content was referred to as the "Me Previous". "Me Pre-
vious~' refers to .the specific consensual definition called forth at any 
l. 
particular time. The source of this call was referenced as the "Me 
Present"; the latter occupies mental position two; structurally, it 
takes the place of the Chicagoan "Me", content wise, it lacks a Chica-
goan cohort, just as the "I" has no "explicit" cohort in the current 
formulation. The "Me Present", seen as the perceived normative content 
mediating interaction in any situation, is again quite comparable to the 
Iowan "perceived role other definition". 
Though the comparability between the Iowan and the Io-Chicagoan 
perspectives was seen as constant to that point, the latter formulation 
was identified as accommodating not only a testable statement of def ini-
tion, but also was noted for retaining the "essence" of the original 
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Chicagoan proposition. Other advantages followed also, including its 
(the Io-Chicagoan rationale) utility ih positing further research ques-
tions; yet, this argument was tempered with the realization of its less 
than deterministic explanation. The following research questions thus 
became evident: 1) Is there a significant difference in the number of 
individuals whose behavior is informed by a Chicagoan, Iowan, or Io-
Chicagoan conception of the self? 2) over variable situations, will the 
number of persons whose behavior is in line with the Io-Chicagoan hy-
pothesis characterize a quantitatively greater number of person's be-
havior than either the Chicagoan or the Iowan hypotheses? 
To test these questions, data was collected from introductory 
sociology students (selected on the basis of the responses obtained from 
their TST and the attitudinal basis underlying these responses). Stu-
dents were selected if they identified themselves by "sex" and by the 
term "student", among the first ten responses. These students then 
elaborated the meaning of being a ;'male" or "female;i ~nd the meaning of 
being a "student" for them. Next the selection process involved taking 
those potential subjects whose responses after content analysis sug-
gested an attitude favorable or unfavorable with respect to the women's 
liberationist ideology and an utilitarian attitude toward their status 
as a student. Students meeting the above criteria served in the experi-
mental phase of the data collection procedures. This involved a distinct 
encounter group (two confederates and a naive subject). The confeder-
ates, while the subject was under the impression that he/she and the 
other two people were waiting to participate in an experiment, acted in 
a specified manner, i.e., contrary to the attitudinal implications in-
ferred earlier from the subject. The confederates noted whether the 
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subject would commit him/herself to some behavior in line with the oper-
ative normative standards, portrayed by the confederates. This per-
ceived situation by the subject is the ''Me Present". Afterward, sub-
jects completed an inventory, listing the consensual statements of the 
subject. To complete this inventory, subjects recalled the cognitions 
(positive and negative) involved in the earlier encounter with the con-
federates. Responses were interpreted in terms of whether they could 
be scored as support for the Chicagoan, Iowan, or Io-Chicagoan. 
' These procedures, followed for both the aforem~ntioned TST identi-
fications, over the test population, resulted in a frequency count of 
relative support for the three perspectives. Simple test of the 
significance of difference in frequencies and proportions, and a sto-
chastic analysis, referred to as a Differential Rate procedure, were 
calculated in order to precisely establish the relative support for the 
three theoretical perspectives. 
The results of these procedures were seen as offering direct 
answers to the research questions. The answer to the first research 
question (Is there a significant difference in the number of individuals 
whose behavior is informed by a Chicagoan, Iowan, or Io-Chicagoan con-
ception of the self?) was "yes". Specifically, the results showed that 
there was a significantly greater proportion of support for the Chica-
goan perspective when compared with the Iowan perspective for situation 
One. Analysis of situation Two, however, showed the opposite conclu-
sion; there was significantly more support for the Iowan perspective 
than the Chicagoan perspective. The lack of the accumulation of sig-
nificant support for either perspective was evident in the case of the 
comparisons between the Chicagoan and the Io-Chicagoan categories for 
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both situations. With respect to the Io-Chicagoan and the Iowan ration-
ales, situation One showed the significantly greater support for the 
Io-Chicagoan perspective, when contrasted with the support received by 
the Iowan perspective; however, a direct reversal in the conclusions was 
necessitated for situation Two. There was significantly more support 
for the Iowan perspective as contrasted with the Io-Chicagoan perspec-
tive. 
The answer to the second question (over variable situations, will 
the number of persons whose behavior is in line with tlhe Io~Chicagoan 
hypothesis characterize a quantitatively greater number of persons' be-
havior than either the Chicagoan or the Iowan hypotheses?) was "no". 
Specifically, the results showed, for the present data, that over time, 
it is possible to expect behavior to be significantly more in line with 
the Iowan rationale, rather than the Io-Chicagoan rationale or the Chica-
goan rationale. 
It is in terms of these answers to the research questions that a 
few general comments can be made concerning the importance and the im-
plications of the present study. 
Of course, the general factor guiding the above arguments as well 
as underlying the present comments has been and is a search for the 
clarification, theoretically and empirically, of the symbolic interac-
tionist orientation as a social psychological theoretical (research) 
perspective; the specific corollary is the intention of making the per-
spective a viable one within this substantive area. A step in this 
direction has certainly been taken, whatever the present inadequacies in 
the operationality of these several theoretical concepts. At the same 
time, it is noted that though many of the definitional problems that 
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beset the interactionist orientation, have been encountered in the pres-
ent study, many other perplexities are present, whose clarification 
await attention. For example, what is the precise relation between the 
"Me" and the "generalized other"? Is the understanding of the "Me" to 
be a broader category subsuming the "generalized other" or is it to be 
equated with the "generalized other", that is, do both the "Me" and the 
"generalized other" refer to one or several internalized other(s). Per-
haps the even more basic question, in this context, is just what the 
consensus of agreement is on the meaning of any one of the. terms. In-
deed this relation must be clarified before it will be possible to seek 
answers to the subsequent questions of the nature of the relation between 
the "Me", "generalized other", "Me Previous", and "Me Present." This 
understanding would add to the further development of the interactionist 
orientation. A series of additional hypotheses have emerged from these 
arguments, as well. 
It would be of interest to examine the research questions of this 
study over varying contrived interactional situations, i.e., groups 
whose "given off" perceptual-cognitive content corresponds to lesser 
relevant consensual (TST) identifications (TST consensual identifica-
tions occurring in the latter half of the TST instrument) of the sub-
ject, or to nonrelevant consensual identifications (having no TST con-
sensual identification cohort among the subject's TST responses). With 
this data, further questions would become evidenced, i.e., questions of 
the "inner forum" experience. What, for example, characterizes the 
"inner forum", when the "Me Present" cognition does not correspond to 
any of the "Me Previous" cognitions, or when it has various conflicting 
states relevant to the "Me Previous". 
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Additionally, it has been observed that the actual data rest upon 
the assumption that the subject is able to accurately concatenate and 
recall the cognitive elements that informed his behavior at some speci-
fied time. Just how adequate this assumption is is an empirical ques-
tion. Research endeavors seeking the determination of the extent of 
the discrepancy between this assumption and empirical fact are manda-
tory. The investigator's experience in this research attest to this 
fact. For instance, while for many of the subjects, responding to the 
inventory check list was of little difficulty, for others, it was a most 
difficult task. The need for the establishment of the systematic quality 
of the above methodology could be increased by incorporating a means of 
structurally (therefore more precisely) gathering information on the 
person's groups to which he refers himself for behavior in any situation. 
This suggest the usefulness of some procedure or modification of some 
procedure that could take the place of the consensual inventory check 
list and the assumptions which underlie its use. This latter procedure, 
of course, would be dependent upon its own assumption (that indeed a 
relation exist between the self and one's reference other(s)), but it 
is based on a theoretical assumption, the adequacy of which could be 
tested and used as a check on the postulated relationship of self infor-
mative indications and their relationship to one's socially significant 
other(s) from which these definitions are obtained. 
In a similar vein, serious consideration must also be given to 
what has earlier been referred to as the "lack of systematic research 
qualities" in the categorizing of the TST identifications into consens-
ual and nonconsensual statements. McPhail (1968), has shown the theo-
retical definition of consensual statements (self statements agreed 
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upon and requiring no further interpretation) to be empirically unfound-
ed. ' Additionally in this same article, the writer questions the ordin-
ality assumption (that consensual and subconsensual statements form an 
ordinal scale when examined with Guttrnan's model fo~ scalogram analysis), 
an assumption basic to the research procedures of tl~is study. These 
various questions cast doubt on the validity and reliability of the TST 
as it is used in the operationalizations of the basic construct of this 
paper. An accommodation to these criticisms of the measurement instru-
ment is indeed in order. 
This topic raises a deeper matter concerning the relationship be-
tween the Iowan and Io-Chicagoan perspectives. Both the similarities 
and the differences of the two approaches have been discussed. The 
reader will recall that a major theoretical and research distinction be-
tween the two revolves around the role of the "processual nature of the 
self"; that is, the theoretical incorporation, as well as the research 
incorporation of a intra-individual mentalistic interaction process. 
This argument, it was argued, held because of the deductive implications 
of Kuhn's theory. Thus, for example, the perceived role other defini-
tion indeed calls forth the appropriate concensual self definition; this 
was seen as the extent of the symbolic interaction, however. Logically, 
there would not need to be any further mental interaction. Although 
this is the only logical implication, it would be interesting for re-
search purposes to disavow this implication and allow that the person 
does indeed rehearse many of his incorporated definitions. This would 
bring the Iowan and Io-Chicagoan perspectives much closer conceptually, 
in terms of the importance of the processu~l role of the self. The two 
perspectives would still remain distinct, however. This difference is 
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reflected by the fact that the ultimate self definition informing be-
havior, for the Iowans; would be one congruent with the role other def-
inition. This would not necessarily be the case tor the Io-Chicagoan 
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perspective. Indeed, according to the latter perspective, the person 
may go through a long line of rehearsed consensual definitions as well 
as their interactions with each other. The result may be that the per-
son may act in line with the "Me Present" (role other definition), but 
it is just as likely that he will not act in this manner because another 
consensual definition may have a potency value for him that exceeds the 
value of the self definition, corresponding to the "Me Present". This 
once again details the totally deterministic orientation of the Iowan 
perspective, al.beit the less than nondeterministic, as well as the less 
than deterministic approach of the Io-Chicagoan approach when it is 
compared with the Chicagoan and Iowan perspectives, respectively. 
This more liberal interpretaion of the Iowan perspective is one 
that could be empirically tested if the interpretation is believed to 
have merit. All that would be necessary, from the perspective of the 
present research paradigm would be to incorporate into the post experi-
mental inventory a statement asking the respondent to make a distinction 
between predisposing and precipitating consensual alternatives. In this 
case, the inventory check list could have responses in more than just 
the "Me Previous" definition, corresponding to the "M~ Present" cogni-
tion, and support would accumulate for both the Iowan and Io-Chicagoan 
perspectives. Additionally, however, the respondent would mark the pre-
cipitating factor that led to his behavior. If the so-marked category 
was one corresponding to the "Me Previous", support could be scored for 
the Iowans; if the marked category was any of the other definitions 
83 
(that is, besides the "Other" category) as well as the definition con-
gruent with the "Me Present", support would obtain for the Io-Chicagoan 
perspective. The resulting nonmutually exclusive nature of the category 
responses would, of course, necessitate an accommodating statistical 
analysis technique. This scoring suggestion is only one, and perhaps 
indeed needs further refining and/or modification. The major point 
presently is not to arrive at a definitive solution to the several im-
plications being voiced, but only to make a few of them (and the conse-
quences following their application) evident. 
Additionally, the need for a more parsimonious measurement proce-
dure is another.implication from the above procedures. Perhaps some 
scoring procedure could be found relevant for distinguishing among sub-
jects' "modes of behavior as informed by a self;" interest would then 
arise concerning the variation of the scores, thus suggesting other 
statistical and/or analytical techniques. 
Also, the issue of the relevance of some type of computer simula-
tion algorithm is evident. What are the possibilities of a computer 
program which starts with known attitudinally based self identifications 
and a specific discussion topic (i.e., the situational perceptional-
cognitive factor in the above conception--the Me Present), with the ul-
timate objective being the prediction of the behavior informing quali-
ties of the self (i.e., the Iowan, Chicagoan or Io-Chicagoan). Inter-
vening in the simulation procedure, various contingencies could be pro-
vided for (for example and hypothetically, the assumption might be that 
the more, "socially anchored" person will be one whose behavior is in-
formed by an Io-Chicagoan interpretation of the self. The results 
could be compared to actual findings and the discrepancies, used as an 
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indication of the appropriateness of the simulation. The possibilities 
here are tremendous, especially considering the larger number of con-
tingent variable conditions which can be handled by the computer, rela-
tive to the unaided human brain. 
Another implication, stressed throughout this study has been the 
emp~asis on the importance of offering a most explicit and credible 
theoretical accommodation to the guiding human behavioral function: 
Behavior = Person X Environment. This latter variable is most often 
theoretically (and consequently, empirically) denied present social 
psychological conception and research, thus the inconsistencies in 
socio-psychological literature and the resultant failure of various 
social program agencies which use this literature to inform their pro-
grams. An even greater accommodation to the situation can be demanded. 
That is, one can obtain such measures as those postulated in this study 
by the study of the' actual groups of which the subjects are participants. 
This research design would study subjects within their actual reference 
groups, among individuals who constitute real significant others for the 
subjects. 
The final, but perhaps most immediate implication that is evidenced 
from the summary and conclusions presented in this chapter is recogni-
tion of the fact that in spite of the apparent conclusiveness of the 
above findings, it is necessary to recognize that what comes out of an 
analysis is only as good as what goes into it; therefore, it is of ex-
treme importance to refrain from accepting the above conclusions without 
additional interpretation and discussion of them. The first remark that 
can be made is directed to the latter stages of the analytical proced-
ures (answering the second research question). It is quite evident that 
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the value .of the respective trans.ition rates within each table (Tables 
V, VI, VII; Chapter V) will be a function of the time priority of the 
respective observations and the associated experiment\:i.l situations. 
That is, the rate will reflect the change in frequencies with respect 
to their initial magnitude (situation One) and the magnitude at a sub-
sequent time (situation Two). This should represent little problem, as 
long as the referents of the observations (the situations) are theoreti-
cally equated. However, if they are not, then it is possible to antici-
pate the meaninglessness of the relative transition rates and their con-
sequent aggregate equilibrium points. 
The specific situational referents for the present research were 
the cognitions informing the behavior of: 1) signing or not signing a 
letter to the school newspaper in support of women's liberation; 2) co-
signing or not co-signing a letter to the school newspaper, supporting 
arguments against a mandatory class policy of using s~udents in social 
psychological experiments. The two situations were experimentally 
created in order to represent situations, which when cognized by the 
subject would constitute a perceptual-cognitive factor, a factor re-
flecting a central part of his self definition. The two self definition 
factors, corresponding, respectively, to the two experimetally manipu-
lated perceptual-cognitive factors ·were: "I am a male (female)" and 
"I am a student". The hypothesis suggested, presently, is that there 
is something consensually different about the meaning to an individual 
of identifying himself as a male/female and identifying himself as a 
student. Indeed, both of these definitions are consensual definitions, 
as opposed to nonconsensual ones; that is, the person identifies him/ 
herself in terms of observable social categories. However, the present 
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hypothesis is that it is necessary to make an additiohal distinction 
among the consensual definitions themselves. As a step in this direc-
' tion, it would seem that the variable of the "temporariness" or "per-
manency" of the self definition for the respondent must be taken into 
consideration. The permanency of one's sex identification is quite 
evident. In general interactionist terms, the totality of one's role 
identities .often can be seen as revolving around the sex identification. 
Thus, it should be expected that any situation presenting itself direct-
ly to this central identity will therefore implicate a greater number 
of other identities than if a less central (less meaningful) identity 
had been confronted. It follows that the identification of one's self 
as a student, while important, is a definition of extreme transiency. 
Theoretically and. as reflected in the obtained results, the deduction 
can be made that the recognition of the relevance of the perceptual-
cognitive factor for the person's self identity is more meaningful if 
that factor and the corresponding self definition is a more or less 
permanent one; in such a permanent, meaningful case, the person will 
take more time symbolically weighing his "Me Previous", making sure that 
the implicated behavior will not result in some unwanted consequence. 
For the perceptural-cognitive factor associated with a less permanent 
self definition, the degree of its connectedness should not be as great 
as in the former case; therefore, the person should not feel that he 
must weigh the consequences as carefully. 
The totality of this argument is reflected in all aspects of the 
present data analysis. During observation One (situation One, the sex 
identification experimentally manipulated factor), only 15 out of 100 
of the subjects' responses could be interpreted in terms of the Iowan 
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perspective in contrast to 48 out of 100 (almost 50%) via the Io-Chica-
goan perspective and 37 out of 100 for the Chicagoan perspective. This 
can be compared .to observation (situation) Two, the student identific~-
tion experimentally manipulated factor; 56 out of;lOO (over 50%) of the 
responses were coded in terms of support for the ::owan interpretation, 
comparable to 19 out of 100 and 25 out of 100, respectively, for the 
Chicagoan and Io-Chicagoan interpretations. Of course, the significant 
proportions for situation One reflect this argument in more cogent terms. 
The immediate implication of these.arguments is the empirical rep-
resentation and testing of additional consensual self definitions (hy-
pothesized permanent and temporary ones) to see if the same findings as 
above, obtain. If they do, a significant trend observed in this re-
search, especially in situation One, deserves much further empirical 
consideration. This trend is reflected in the significant difference 
found between Iowan and Io-Chicagoan empirical support. Additionally, 
despite the lack of significant difference between the Chicagoan and 
• 
the Io-Chicagoan empirical support and even if the discussion and inter-
pretation of the present findings do not hold in future research, a 
credible alternative theoretical symboiic interactionist perspective 
has been demonstrated, both substantiatively and empirically. This is 
indeed a step above and beyond the dilemma that presently characterizes 




Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method. Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Coleman, J. s. 
1964 Introduction to Mathematical Sociology. New York: The Free 
Press. 
Cooley, c. H. 
1922 Human Nature and the Social Order. Revised edition. New 
York: Scribner's. 
Cottrell, L. 
1942 "The Analysis of Situational Fields in Social Psychology." 
American Sociological Journal 7 (June): 370-387. 
Desmonde, w. H. 
1970 "The Position of George Herbert Mead." Pp.·51-62 in G. P. 
Stone and H. A. Farberman (eds.), Social Psychology Through 
Symbolic Interaction. Waltham Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell. 
Denzin, N. K. 
1970a 
1970b 
"Introduction: Test of the Perspective." Pp. 415-418 in G. P. 
Stone and H. A. Farberman (eds.), Social Psychology Through 
Symbolic Interaction. Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell. 
"The Methodologies of Symbolic Interaction: A Critical Review 
of Research Techniques." Pp. 447-465 in G. P. Stone and H. A. 
Farberman (eds.), Social Psychology Through Symbolic Interac-
tion. Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell. 
Downie, N •. w. and R. w. Heath 
1965 Basic Statistical Methods. New York: Harper and Row. 
Faine, J. R. 
1973 "A Self-consistency Approach to Prisonization." Sociological 
Quarterly 14 (Autumn): 576-588. 
88 
89 
Garretson, W. S. 
1962 "The Consensual Definition of Social Objects." Sociological 
Quarterly 3 (April): 107-113. 
Gecas, V., J. M, Calonico and D. L. Thomas 
1974 "The Development of Self Concept in the Child: Mirrow Theory 
Versus Model Theory." Journal of Social Psychology 92 
(February): 67-76. 
Glaser, B. G. and A. L. Strauss 
1967 The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Chicago: Aldine Publishing 
Company. 







Principles and Methods of Social Psychology. Second Edition, 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
"Symbolic Interaction as a Pragmatic Perspective: The Bias 
of Emergent Theory." American Sociological Review 38 (April): 
274-284. 
"The Emergency of Emergent Theory." American Sociological Re-
view 39 (June): 463-467. 
The Principles of Psychology. New York: H. Holt and Company. 
Kolb, W. L. 
1967 "A Critical Evaluation of Mead's "I" and "Me Concepts." Pp. 
241-250 in J. G. Manis and B. N. Meltzer (eds.), Symbolic In-
teraction: A Reader in Social Psychology. Boston: Allyn and 
Bacon. 
Kuhn, M. H. and T. S. McPartland 
1954 "An Empirical Investigation of Self Attitudes." American 
Sociological Review 19 (February): 68-76. 
Kuhn, M. H. and C. A. Hickman 
1956 Individuals, Groups and Economic Behavior. New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston. 
Kuhn, M. H. 
1964a "Major Trends in Symbolic Interaction in the Past Twenty-five 
90 
Years." The Sociological Quarterly 5 (Winter): 61-84. 
1964b "Self." P. 629 in J. Gould and w. L. Kolb (eds.) A Dictionary 
of the Social Sciences. New York: The Free Press. 
1964c "The Reference Group Reconsidered." The Sociological Quarter-
ly 5 (Winter): 5. 
Lindesmith, A. R. and A. L. Strauss 
1968 Social Psychology. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Linn, L. S. 
1965 "Verbal Attitudes and overt Behavior: A Study of Racial Dis-
crimination." Social Forces 44 (March): 353-364. 
Lundberg, G. A. 
1939 Foundations of Sociology. New York. The MacMillan Company. 
Maehn, M. L., J. Mensing and S. Nafager 
1962 "Concept of Self and the Reactions of Others." Sociometry 25 
(December): 353-357. 
Mahoney, E. R. 
1973 "The Processual Characteristics of Self Conception." The 
Sociological Quarterly 14 (Autumn): 517-533. 
Martindale, D. 
1960 The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company. 
McPhail, c. 
1968 "Respondents Judgements of Self Statements." Sociological 
Quarterly 9 (Spring): 202-209. 
McPhail, c. and C. W. Tucker 
1972 "The Classification and Ordering of Responses to the Question 
'Who Am I?'." The Sociolgoical Quarterly 13 (Summer): 329-
347. 
McPartland, T. s. and J. H. Cumming 
1958 "Self Conception, Social Class and Mental Health." Human 
Organization 17 (No. 3): 24-29. 
91 
Mead, G. H. 
1934 Mind, self and society. c. Morris (ed.). Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Meltzer, B. N. 
1964 "Mead's Social Psychology." Pp. 5-24 in J. G. Manis and B. N. 
Meltzer (eds.), Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in Social Psy-
chology. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Meltzer, B. N. and J. W. Petras 
1970 "The Chicago and Iowa Schools of Symbolic Interactionism." 
Pp. 3-17 in T. Shibutani (ed.), Human Nature and Collectiv-e 
Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
Miyamoto, S. F. 
1959 "The Social Act: Re-Examination of a Concept." ·Pacific Soc-
iological Review 2 (Fall): 51. 
Miyamoto, s. F. and s. M. Dornbusch 
1956 "A Test of the Symbolic Interactionist Hypothesis of Self Con-
ception." American Journal of Sociology 61 (March): 399-403. 
Petras, J. w. and B. N. Meltzer 
1972 "Theoretical and Ideological Variations in Contemporary Inter-
actionism." Catalyst. Trent University, Ontario, Canada. 
Quarantelli, E. L. and J. Cooper 
1966 "Self Conceptions and Others: A Further Test of Meadian 
Hypotheses." The Sociological Quarterly 7 (Summer): 281-297. 
Shaw, M. E. and P. R. Costanzo 
1970 Theories of Social Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Company. 
Schmitt, R. L. 
1974 "SI and Emergent Theory: A Reexamination." American Socio-
logical Review 39 (June): 453-456. 
Smith, J. R. 
1970 "Perceptions of Self and Other·(Mate) as Motivation for Mar-
riage Counseling: An Interactional Approach." Sociology and 
Social Research 54 (July): 466-476. 
Stebbins, R. A. 
1969 "Studying the Definition of the Situatibn: Theory and Field 
Research Strategies." Canadian Review of Sociology and 
Anthropology 6 (November): 193-211. 
Stevens, s. S. 
92 
1946 "On the Theory of Scales of Measurement." Science 103 (June): 
667-680. 
Stone, G. P., D. R. Maines, H. A. Farberman, G. I. Stone and N. K. Denzin 
1974 "On Methodology and Craftsmanship in the Criticism of Socio-
logical Perspectives." .American Sociological Review 39 (June): 
456-463. 
Thomas, W. I. and D. S. Thomas 
1969 The Unadjusted Girl. Montclair, N. J.: Patterson 
Smith. 
1970 "Situations Defined as Real are Real in Their Consequences." 
P. 154 in G. P. Stone and J. A. Farberman (eds.), Social Psy-
chology Through Symbolic Interaction. Waltham Mass.: Ginn-
Blaisdell. 
Tucker, C. W. 
1966 "Some Methodological Problems of Kuhn's Self Theory." The 
Sociological Quarterly 7 (Summer): 345. 
Vernon, G. M. 
1962 "Religious Self Identification." Pacific Sociological Review 
5 (Spring): 40-43. 
Videbeck, R. 
1960 "Self Conceptions and the Reactions of Others." Sociometry 23 
(December): 351. 
Vroom, V. H. 
1964 Work and Motivation. New York: Wiley. 
Wallace, W. L. 
1971 The Logic of Science in Sociology. Chicago: Aldine Atherton. 
Waller, W. 
1970 "The Definition of the Situation." Pp. 162-174 in G. R. Stone 
and H. A. Farberman (eds.), Social Psychology Through Symbolic 
93 
Interaction. Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell. 




"The Relationship Between Attitudes and Behavior as a Function 
of Specificity of the Attitude Object.•• Unpublished Manu-
script, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee. 
Personality and Problems of Adjustment. New York: F. s. 
Crofts. 
A P P E N D I X E S 
94 
APPENDIX A 
TWENTY STATEMENTS TEST 
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There are 20 numbered blanks on the page below. Please write twenty 
different answers to the question 'Who Am I' in the blanks. Just give 
twenty different answers to this question. Answer as if you were giving 
the answers to yourself, not to somebody else. Write the answers in the 
order that they occur to you. Don't worry about logic or importance. 























OPEN-ENDED ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Earlier in the semester, you filled out the initial part of this ques-
tionnaire. The second stage of the present research endeavo~ is merely 
one which seeks a further clarification of a couple of your initial 
answers. Specifically, you mentioned that you were: 1. a studenti 2. 
a male (female) and/or man (woman). 
For each response label below: (studenti male (female) and/or man 
(woman)), please write one sentence describing what that response means 
to you. For example, write one sentence telling what being ~ student 
means to you, that is, for you, what is the most important thing about 
your being a student. Do the same thing for the second response, i.e., 
what is the most important thing about being~ male (female). 
STUDENT 
MALE (FEMALE) AND/OR MAN (WOMAN) 
If you would be willing to participate in an experiment in the 
Sociology Dept., sometime within the next 4 or 5 weeks, please indicate, 
by writing your telephone number, where you can be reached, on the line 
below. It will take only about 10 or 15 minutes of your time. Thank you. 
APPENDIX C 




In the second waiting room, you were asked to sign a letter to the 
O'Colly, supporting some viewpoint. You either did or did not sign. 
Please rethink what your thoughts were at that time, leading you to sign 
or not sign the letter. Consider both thoughts which led you to and 
away from signing. 
If your thoughts leading you to sign or not sign were related to any 
of the items below, please put a check in each applicable blank of the 
first column. For example, ask yourself: Was the reason I signed (or 
did not sign) the letter related to the fact. that I am in a Fraternity. 
If it is, then check Fraternity. If the reason is not in the list (i.e., 









Now use the same directions for the situation, where the conferer-
ate attempted to get you to walk out of the experiment. This time make 
checks in the second column of blanks. Thank you. 
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